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PROMULGATING THE MARRIAGE
CONTRACT
Lynn A. Baker*
From at least the time of Blackstone, Anglo-American legaltheorists have discussed the problem of promulgation of the laws
and the concomitant question of notice.1 Two issues traditionally have been the focus of the debate: Between the individual
and the State, what is the optimal allocation of the burden of
ensuring that the law is known and understood by those whom it
is intended to affect? And how might the State most effectively
meet its portion of that burden?
The bulk of this controversy through the centuries has focused on the criminal law and the circumstances under which
ignorance of legal prohibitions should exempt the violator from
sanctioning.2 The optimal extent and method of promulgation of
other, noncriminal laws, both statutory and judge-made, have
engendered far less frequent or comprehensive discussion. Indeed, Bentham, Blackstone, and Fuller are the only AngloAmerican legal theorists to give these latter issues any substantial attention.3
*
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1. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *45-46, *185. The first edition of Volume 1 appeared in 1765.
To promulgate a law is to "announce [it] officially; to make [it] public.
BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY

1093 (5th ed. 1979).

2. See, e.g., 1 J. BENTHAM, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 83-86 (J. Bowring ed. 1843); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *45-46; J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 102 (2d

ed. 1921); J.

HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW

HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW

376-414 (2d ed. 1960); 0.

40-41 (M. Howe ed. 1963).

3. 1 J. BENTHAM, Essay on the Promulgationof Laws, and the Reasons Thereof; with
Specimen of a Penal Code, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 155-63 (J. Bowring ed.
1843); 3 J. BENTHAM, General View of a Complete Code of Laws, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 155, 205-06 (J. Bowring ed. 1843); 4 J. BENTHAM, Papers Relative to Codification and Public Instruction; Including Correspondence with the Russian Emperor,
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Blackstone considered it a "matter of very great indifference"
how the state provided the ordinary person notice of the laws.'
Public readings in churches and other assemblies, and publication were among the acceptable forms of notice.' Blackstone believed it important only that the law be promulgated in "the
most public and perspicuous manner; not like Caligula, who...
wrote his laws in a very small character, and hung them up upon
high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the people."'
Fuller, like Blackstone, thought that the State's duty extended only to making the laws available and accessible to the
public, leaving the ordinary person to seek out actual knowledge
of those laws of particular personal interest or relevance.'
Fuller's belief that formal publication of the laws provided the
public sufficent notices was buttressed by his expectation that
much of the behavior-guiding force of the law would be transmitted through less formal, interpersonal routes. Although only
and Divers Constituted Authorities in the American United States, in THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 451-594 (J. Bowring ed. 1843); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *4546, *185; L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 49-51 (rev. ed. 1969).
Austin gave the matter brief attention. 2 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 17077 (1863). Gray provided an extensive summary of the promulgation practices of various
countries and historical periods. J. GRAY, supra note 2, at 25, 162-72. See also Gifford,
Communication of Legal Standards, Policy Development, and Effective Conduct Regulation, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 409 (1971).
4. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *45.
5. Id. at *45-46.
6. Id. at *46. One early nineteenth century "editor" of the Commentaries, the barrister Thomas Lee, noted in the 18th edition that he found it "remarkable that nothing
should yet be done whereby a knowledge of the statute law, which all are bound to obey,
is not gratuitously communicated to all." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46 n.10 (T.
Lee 18th ed. 1829). Although Lee asserted that "[wihere, or with whom, such depot
should be placed, is [a] matter of detail," he argued that "there should be convenient
centrical depots; to which, for the purpose of perusing [statutes], every man should have
access gratis." Id. Lee went on to propose that "the keeping [of] a statute book for public
inspection, at a stated hour, might be made a condition precedent to the granting [of] a
dedimus, or to the exercise of the chief authority in corporations." Id.
7.
Obvious and urgent as this demand [that the laws be promulgated] seems, it
must be recognized that it is subject to the marginal utility principle. It would in
fact be foolish to try to educate every citizen into the full meaning of every law
that might conceivably be applied to him, though Bentham was willing to go a
long way in that direction.
The need for this education will, of course, depend upon how far the requirements of law depart from generally shared views of right and wrong.
L. FULLER, supra note 3, at 49-50 (footnote omitted).
8. Because one could not, with any certainty, identify in advance the citizens that a
law would affect, Fuller prescribed general publication of all laws as the best form of
notice. Id. at 50-51. In addition, Fuller thought it important that the laws be published
so they would be available for criticism and so there might be some "check against a
disregard of them by those charged with their application and enforcement." Id. at 51.
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a few persons might actually read the published law and thus
know of it directly, "knowledge of the law by a few often influences indirectly the actions of many."9
In contrast to both Blackstone and Fuller, Bentham believed
the public was entitled to actual, rather than merely formal, notice of the laws. 10 Indeed, the State did not provide sufficient
notice even if it "read [a law] to the people" or "published [it]
with the sound of trumpets in the streets."'" Rather, the essence
of promulgating a law was "to present it to the minds of those
who are to be governed by it in such manner as that they may
have it habitually in their memories, and may possess every facility for consulting it, if they have any doubts respecting what it
prescribes."' 2
Thus, Bentham suggested that adequate public knowledge of
the laws would be possible only upon State creation of a "complete digest"' 3 or "universal code"' 4 that would give some coherence to the "continually increasing and ever shapeless mass of
law [that] is . . . shot down [like garbage] upon the heads of the
people.' 5 Bentham further hoped that this universal code would
9. Id. Although Fuller conceded that "[t]he requirement that laws be published does
not rest on any such absurdity as an expectation that the dutiful citizen will sit down
and read them all," he concluded that "[e]ven if only one man in a hundred takes the
pains to inform himself concerning, say, the laws applicable to the practice of his calling,
this is enough to justify the trouble taken to make the laws generally available." Id.
10. The law should employ
any of the expedients which are necessary, to make sure that every person whatsoever, who is within the reach of the law, be apprized of all the cases whatsoever, in which (being in the station of life he is in) he can be subjected to the
penalties of the law.
1 J. BENTHAM, supra note 2, at 84 (emphasis added).
Bentham believed that only statutes qualified as laws. He considered the common law
a fictional entity:
To be known, an object must have existence. But not to have existence-to be
a mere non-entity-in this case, my friends, is a portion-nay, by far the largest
portion-of that which is passed upon you for law. I speak of common law, as
the phrase is: of the whole of common law. ...
Would you wish to know what a law-a real law-is? Open the statutebook:-in every statute you have a real law: behold in that the really existing
object:-the genuine object, of which the counterfeit, and p-etended counterpart, is endeavoured to be put off upon you by a lawyer, as often as in any
discourse of his the word common law is to be found.
4 J. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 483 (emphasis in original).
11. 1 J. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 157.
12. Id.
13. 3 J. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 205 ("A complete digest: such is the first rule.
Whatever is not in the code of laws, ought not to be law.").
14. 1 J. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 158.
15. 4 J. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 481 n.*.
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become "the chief book" and "one of the first objects of instruction in all schools."16 His less ambitious proposals for ensuring
public knowledge of the laws included making the reading of the
code a regular part of all church services,17 posting in certain

public places (such as theaters, markets, and highways) the laws
affecting those places, ' and requiring that all contracts "be
written upon stamped paper, which should bear upon its margin
a notice of the laws concerning the transaction to which it
referred." 9
With regard to the promulgation problem, we have historically
found Blackstone, and later Fuller, more persuasive than Bentham. Although our laws, civil as well as criminal, are largely
intended
guide
behavior,"
federal andwith
stateensurgovernments to
have
for human
the most
part beenour
unconcerned

16. 1 J. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 158. Bentham wanted all school-age children to
"become more conversant with the laws of their country, than those lawyers at present
are, whose hair has grown grey in the contentions of the bar." Id. Notwithstanding his
advocacy of universal legal education, Bentham asserted, "No: never can the profession
of a lawyer be wholly superseded.
4 J. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 490.
17.
Why should not the reading of the laws form, as it did among the Jews, a part
of divine service? . . . Would it not add dignity to the ceremony, if the laws
respecting parents and children were read upon the performance of baptism?
and the laws respecting husbands and wives at the time of marriage?
1 J. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 158. Bentham added that a test of the appropriate length
of a legal code was whether it would be possible to "read it through many times in the
year" as a part of church services. Id.
18. Id. at 158.
19. Id. at 158-59.
20. Recently, legal scholars have begun to challenge the fundamental assumption of
"legal centrism," which emphasizes the importance of the promulgated law as a behavior-guiding force in society. These scholars have argued that social norms, which may
influence and be influenced by the promulgated law, are also powerful determinants of
individual behavior. See, e.g., M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 4-9
(1987); H. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS
(1980); Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control,
16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1987); Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among
Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986); Macaulay, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A PreliminaryStuy, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963); Ross & Littlefield, Complaint as a Problem-Solving Mechanism, 12 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 199 (1978);
Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAIF. L. REV. 2005 (1987).
Dean Robert Clark has very recently suggested that legal rules are themselves the
product of three norms: contracts, elites, and traditions. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and
Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703 (1989); but cf.
Kronman, A Comment on Dean Clark, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1748 (1989).
Saul Levmore had earlier argued that legal rules tend to be uniform across legal systems when they have important social control functions. Variety among legal systems
arises in rules regulating behavior about which reasonable people may have differing normative views. Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 61 TUL. L. REV. 235 (1986); Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser,16 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1987).
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ing that the public actually knows and understands the law.
They have almost always been satisfied with providing formal
notice, disclosing laws to the public only through the regular
publication of statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions, which
are then available for perusal in special libraries.
The legal formalization of the decision to marry is one of the
very few contexts in which there has been any movement toward
more Benthamite disclosure of the pertinent law to the ordinary
person. In 1975, the Louisiana legislature enacted a requirement
that the state provide information about certain economic terms
of the marriage contract when any individual applies for a marriage license.2" No other state has yet imposed a similar disclos22
ure demand on itself.
21.

The Louisiana legislation, originally enacted in 1975, states in current form:
A. On receiving an application for a license to marry, the license issuing officer
shall deliver to each prospective spouse, either in person or by registered mail, a
printed summary of the then current matrimonial regime laws of this state.
B. This summary shall be prepared by the attorney general of this state. It
shall emphasize the possibility of contracting expressly a regime of one's choosing before marriage, that spouses who have not entered into a matrimonial
agreement before marriage become subject to the legal regime by operation of
law, and the possibility of contracting after marriage to modify the matrimonial
regime.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:237 (West Supp. 1989).
The most recent edition of the "printed summary" that is to be distributed is entitled
"Louisiana Community Property Law and How Its Effects Can Be Changed By Contract." LOUISIANA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LOUISIANA COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW AND How ITS
EFFECTS CAN BE CHANGED By CONTRACT (1980) (on file at University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform). The pamphlet describes in easy-to-understand language both how the
Louisiana community property laws affect property rights upon marriage and how one
formally can contract around them. In addition, it suggests that spouses-to-be see a lawyer "so that you will know how the taxes on your property and the inheritance of your
property may be changed by your marriage." Id. The pamphlet advises residents of large
cities who cannot afford a lawyer to call a Legal Aid Bureau for assistance.
There is, unfortunately, no extant official legislative history of this disclosure legislation setting out the reasons for its enactment. In any case, that information would
merely add to, rather than displace or vitiate, the positive analysis of the Louisiana legislation that I provide in this Article.
22. In law, but not in fact, Kentucky also discloses information about the legal terms
and consequences of the marriage contract to persons requesting to be married. Pursuant
to legislation enacted in 1972
The human resources coordinating commission of Kentucky shall prepare a marriage manual for distribution to all applicants for a marriage license. The manual shall include, but not be limited to, material on family planning, proper
health and sanitation practices, nutrition, consumer economics, and the legal
responsibilities of spouses to each other and as parents to their children.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.270 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (emphasis added). The statute further states that "Each county clerk shall give a copy to each applicant for a marriage license." Id.
In attempting to obtain a copy of the Kentucky manual, I learned that the "Human
Resources Coordinating Commission" no longer exists. Their manual is no longer (if it
ever was) distrubuted to Kentucky marriage license applicants. Telephone interview with
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It is something of a mystery why we have chosen the few contexts that we have in which to disclose the law to the ordinary
person through a means other than regular, formal publication.
Indeed, until the 1975 action by the Louisiana legislature, the
Miranda warning stood nearly alone as an instance of more aggressive promulgation of the law. 3 In this Article, I do not undertake the undoubtedly interesting and important project of
explaining our selection of the few laws that we have promulgated in a more Benthamite manner. Rather, I accept those
choices as given and instead use the age-old promulgation problem as a lens through which to study our legal system's evolving
conception of the marital relationship.
I begin Part I of this Article by positing several logically necessary, but insufficient, conditions that precede a state's decision
to promulgate a law more aggressively than usual. I then show
Omar L. Greeman of the Office of Vital Statistics of the Kentucky "Cabinet for Human
Resources" (June 17, 1988).
23. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-91 (1966). The posting of speed limits
along highways is the other well known example.
In addition, the Massachusetts abuse prevention laws enacted in 1978 require that any
police officer who "has reason to believe that a family or household member has been
abused or is in danger of being abused . . . shall use all reasonable means to prevent
further abuse, including . . . giving such person immediate and adequate notice of his or
her rights.
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 6 (1988). The "notice" required under subsection 6
[Sihall consist of handing such person a copy of the following statement written
in English and Spanish and reading the same to such person in English.
"You have the right to go to the superior, probate, and family, district or Boston municipal court . . . and file a complaint requesting any of the following
applicable orders: (a) an order restraining your attacker from abusing you; (b) an
order directing your attacker to leave your household; (c) an order awarding you
custody of a minor child; (d) an order directing your attacker to pay support for
you or any minor child in your custody if the attacker has a legal obligation to
support them; and (e) an order directing your attacker to pay you for losses
suffered as a result of the abuse, including medical and moving expenses, loss of
earnings or support, attorneys fees and other out-of-pocket losses for injuries
sustained."
"You have the right to go to the appropriate . . . court and seek a criminal
complaint for threats, assault and battery, assault with a deadly weapon, assault
with intent to kill or other related offenses."
"If you are in need of medical treatment, you have the right to request that
the officer present drive you to the nearest hospital or otherwise assist you in
obtaining medical treatment."
"If you believe that police protection is needed for your physical safety, you
have the right to request that the officer present remain at the scene until you
and your children can leave or until your safety is otherwise insured."
Id.
Finally, the laws of several states require that certain medical facilities apprise patients of their legal rights. See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2803-c (McKinney 1985 &
Supp. 1989); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 70E (1988).
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that each of these conditions was met with regard to the economic terms of the marriage contract in virtually all states by
1975. In Part II, I explore what Louisiana's unusually aggressive
promulgation of certain terms of the marriage contract reveals
about the legal system's conception of the marital relationship
as of 1975. In Part III, I discuss what is added to that conception of the modern marital relationship by the fact that nearly
15 years later none of the remaining states has yet followed Louisiana's lead.

I.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF AGGRESSIVE PROMULGATION OF THE
MARRIAGE CONTRACT

We might logically expect three necessary, but seemingly not
sufficient, conditions to have been met anytime the State discloses, or requires disclosure of, a law through means other than
regular, formal publication. First, we would expect knowledge of
a law that is aggressively promulgated to have some ex ante utility.2 Such knowledge should have the potential to affect an individual's decision making; ignorance of it would therefore entail
certain risks and potential costs. Second, we would expect that
the typical recipient of the aggressively conveyed information
would neither already have it nor be likely to seek it out at the
most appropriate time. Third, we would expect that the potential benefits of providing the ordinary person this information
would exceed the costs. In fact, each of these conditions had
been met in virtually all states by 1975. In addition, the ideas of
mandatory disclosure requirements and aggressive promulgation
of certain laws had historically "ripened" within American legal
culture.

24. Not all laws have, or are intended to have, such ex ante utility: Some laws "attempt neither to establish norms for the future nor to judge the past..
" Dane,
Vested Rights, "Vestedness," and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191, 1233 (1987). Among
these laws, Professor Dane includes those governing "allocative decisions made by governments," such as the granting of licenses, the distribution of welfare, taxation, and
child custody determinations. Id. at 1233-36.
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The Potential Utility of Knowledge of the Marriage
Contract

Although the law has long explicitly characterized marriage as
a legal "contract" among husband, wife, and the State,25 most of
its terms traditionally have neither been negotiated by the parties, nor set out in a single document. Rather, the terms have
preexisted each marriage as scattered state statutes and judicial
decisions of broad applicability. Historically, the vast majority of
these laws have directly concerned the spouses' economic condition. Marital status has frequently made a difference in our
property,2 6 estate,2 7 tax,2 8 and financial support laws,29 while our
25. While the courts have long characterized marriage as a "civil contract," see, e.g.,
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210 (1888) ("[M]arriage is often termed by text writers
and in decisions of courts a civil contract"); Clark v. Clark, 10 N.H. 380, 382 (1839) ("A
perfected negotiation, or treaty, of marriage, is undoubtedly a civil contract."), they have
simultaneously made clear that it is in many respects unlike other contracts. The classic
judicial description appears in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. at 210-11:
It is also to be observed that, whilst marriage is often termed by text writers and
in decisions of courts a civil contract-generally to indicate that it must be
founded upon the agreement of the parties, and does not require any religious
ceremony for its solemnization-it is something more than a mere contract. The
consent of the parties is of course essential to its existence, but when the contract to marry is executed by the marriage, a relation between the parties is
created which they cannot change. Other contracts may be modified, restricted,
or enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the parties. Not so with
marriage. The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to
various obligations and liabilities. It is an institution, in the maintenance of
which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the
family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor
progress.
See also, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 10 N.H. at 382-83 (marriage "contains all the essential
characteristics of a contract, and it has something superadded. It has been said to be a
matter of civil institution, and to be the very basis of the whole fabric of civilized society. . . . It is a contract of a very peculiar character."); In re Marriage of Franks, 189
Colo. 499, 506, 542 P.2d 845, 850 (1975) ("It has been stated on numerous occasions that
a marriage is a contract between the parties. While this may be so, it is undeniably
distinguishable from the ordinary civil contract. The institution of marriage has always
been peculiarly a creature of the state, and subject to regulation by its legislature.").
Today, the domestic relations statutes of many states explicitly mention the contractual, if sui generis, nature of marriage. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (1989)
("Marriage is a civil contract ..
"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-103 (1985) ("Marriage is a
personal relationship between a man and a woman arising out of a civil contract to which
the consent of the parties is essential.").
26. See infra text accompanying notes 31-47; see also H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 286-304, 589-618 (2d ed. 1988) and cases
cited therein [hereinafter H. CLARK, JR., SECOND EDITION].
27. Should either spouse die without a will, the law of most states places the deceased's spouse near the top of the list of persons to inherit the estate. See, e.g., N.Y.
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. L. ch.
190, § 1 (1988). See generally E. CLARK, L. LUSKY & A. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS
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laws governing crimes, torts, and testimonial privilege have only
occasionally treated single, married, and divorced persons
differently.3"
The terms of the marriage contract can be divided into two
general types: those whose consequences attach so long as the
marriage continues, and those that are applicable only if the
marriage dissolves through death or divorce. Laws of the first
type have largely concerned the spouses' relationship in the areas of property rights and economic support during marriage. 3
Here, the spouses' personal, informal arrangements have with
rare exception been permitted to govern free from State interference, making knowledge of the pertinent law essentially unnecessary.3 2 For knowledge of the law is of ex ante utility only if
ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS: WILLS, INTESTATE SUCCESSION, TRUSTS, GIFTS AND FUTURE INTERESTS

65-75 (2d ed. 1977).

Should the deceased have a valid will at the time of death, the majority of states
provide the spouse a "forced share" of the estate even if the deceased has not provided
for the spouse in the will. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney
1981 & Supp. 1990); see generally E. CLARK, L. LUSKY & A. MURPHY, supra, at 123-26,
143-44.
28. While our tax laws treat the divorced person the same as an individual who has
never married, they treat the income of married persons who file jointly differently than
the income of single or divorced persons, the net effect varying systematically with the
income level of the spouses. See W. KLEIN, B. BIrTTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 40-43 (7th ed. 1987).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 32-49; H. CLARK, JR., SECOND EDITION, supra
note 26, at 250-85, 619-708 and cases cited therein.
30. See, e.g., J. AREEN, FAMILY LAW 184-226 (2d ed. 1985); H. CLARK, JR., SECOND EDITION, supra note 26, at 304-08, 370-74; I. ELLMAN, P. KURTZ & A. STANTON, FAMILY LAW
131-56 (1986); W.

WADLINGTON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS

246-86 (1984).
31. By 1975, a fundamental consequence of marriage was that each spouse acquired a
duty to support the other. In a small minority of states, the husband remained solely
responsible for the financial support of his wife during marriage, and the wife bore a
reciprocal duty to render services in the home. The law of most states, however, had
become gender neutral and required spouses to support each other financially during
marriage in proportion to their individual abilities. H. CLARK, JR., SECOND EDITION, supra
note 26, at 250-258, 265-66.
Marriage also affected the property rights of the spouses. By 1975, the right of each
spouse to the ownership and control of the property with which he or she entered the
marriage-so-called "separate property"-was largely unaffected by marriage in most
states. Id. at 286-303, 595-600. Property acquired by either spouse during the marriage,
however, was treated by the states in one of two ways. States thaf followed the old common law rule considered property acquired during the marriage to be within the sole
ownership and control of the holder(s) of legal title. The majority of states, however,
considered such property "marital property," legally owned and subject to the control of
both spouses in common. Id.
32. Some women who have had no interest in obtaining a separation or a divorce
have nonetheless sued their spouses to obtain greater financial support during marriage.
See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 320 Mich. 43, 30 N.W.2d 509 (1948); McGuire v. McGuire, 157
Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953); Pattberg v. Pattberg, 94 N.J. Eq. 715, 120 A. 790 (1923);
Commonwealth v. George, 358 Pa. 118, 56 A.2d 228 (1948).
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enforcement of that law might be formally requested, a highly
unlikely event in an ongoing intimate relationship. 3
In contrast, knowledge of those terms of the marriage contract
applicable only upon the dissolution of the marriage had acquired substantial ex ante utility by 1975 as a result of various
developments in American law and society. Those changes increased the range of choices available to both spouses in several
areas, simultaneously increasing the utility of knowledge of the
laws pertinent to those choices. Perhaps the most important of
these developments was a substantial increase in the likelihood
of divorce. By 1975, the "divorce rate" had reached 48%. 3 " Thus,
an individual who married faced a substantial chance that the
primarily economic laws governing marital dissolution would
eventually be applied to him. 5

The courts, however, have historically been reluctant to enter a support decree as long
as the spouses are living together. Courts have reasoned, first, that '"[the living standards of a family are a matter of concern to the household, and not for the courts to
determine," McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. at 238, 59 N.W.2d at 342; Commonwealth v.
George, 358 Pa. 118, 56 A.2d 228, and second, that the husband is entitled to determine
the standard of living of the household. McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. at 238, 59
N.W.2d at 342 ("As long as the home is maintained and the parties are living as husband
and wife, it may be said that the husband is legally supporting his wife and the purpose
of the marriage relation is being carried out."); Pattberg v. Pattberg, 94 N.J. Eq. 715, 120
A. 790. But see Miller v. Miller, 320 Mich. at 49, 30 N.W.2d at 511 (where there exists a
"great discrepancy between the husband's very large income and the very small and insufficient amount he is willing to pay [his wife] for her maintenance and support" husband is guilty of "non-support and extreme cruelty").
33. A marriage in which one spouse is willing to sue the other over property or economic support is likely nearing its end, in which case the laws governing the economics
of marital dissolution will come into effect.
34. The concept of the "divorce rate" is usually defined either as the ratio of dissolutions to marriages in a given year or as the number of divorces per 1000 total population.
The ratio of dissolutions to marriages rose steadily until 1975: 13.37% in 1920, 17.39%
in 1930, 16.54% in 1940, 23.10% in 1950, 25.80% in 1960, 32.80% in 1970, and 48.13% in
1975. Between 1975 and 1985, the most recent year for which official statistics are available, the ratio has wavered between 47.19% and 50.66%. In 1985, the ratio was 49.32%.
See 3 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES:
1985, at table 2-1 (divorces) & table 1-1 (marriages) (1989).
The number of divorces per one thousand total population likewise rose steadily until
1975: 1.6 in 1920, 1.6 in 1930, 2.0 in 1940, 2.6 in 1950, 2.2 in 1960, 3.5 in 1970, and 4.8 in
1975. Between 1975 and 1985, the number wavered between 4.8 and 5.3. In 1985, the
number was 5.0. See id. at table 2-1.
35. The major substantive matters for resolution upon divorce are property distribution, spousal support, child support, and child custody.
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Second, the enactment of no-fault divorce laws"6 meant that
either spouse could end the marriage at nearly any time37 without proving the other guilty of adultery or another of the specified antisocial behaviors that historically had been grounds for
divorce.3 8 Because a formal finding of one "guilty" and one "innocent" spouse was no longer necessary to dissolve a marriage,
the spouses' post-divorce financial condition also became somewhat less predictable. The courts would no longer restrict
awards of alimony to "innocent" economically dependent wives,
and the form of those awards began to deviate from traditional
"permanent alimony" sufficient to maintain the wife, insofar as
possible, at the marital standard of living. 9
Most state statutes governing post-divorce spousal support
had remained essentially unchanged since their original enactment in the eighteenth century, and those laws had always instructed the courts simply to award such support as they considered "just," "equitable," or "suitable."'" Upon the abolition of
36. Although California is usually thought to have been the pioneer in no-fault divorce, New York in fact was the first state to pass such legislation. In 1966, more than
three years before the California legislation, New York enacted a law permitting divorce
upon a showing simply that the spouses had lived separate and apart for two years. 1966
N.Y. LAWS 254. The two years were reduced to one in 1970. 1970 N.Y. LAws 835. For a
fascinating description of how the New York legislation arose, see H. JACOB, SILENT
REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 30-42, 81
(1988).
The 1969 California legislation eliminated all fault grounds and permitted divorce only
upon a showing of incurable insanity or "irreconcilable differences which have caused the
irremediable breakdown of the marriage." 1969 CAL. STAT. 1608s. For a discussion of the
legislative and social history of California's no-fault law, see H. JACOB, supra, at 43-61.
37. In states such as New York, in which the no-fault route to divorce required the
spouses to live separate and apart for a certain period, see supra note 36, divorce could
entail a "waiting period." These periods ranged from six months in Vermont, see VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (1974), to five years in Idaho, see IDAHO CODE § 32-610 (1983).
See also H. CLARK, JR., SECOND EDITION, supra note 26, at 517-21.
38. By 1974, 45 states had some form of no-fault divorce law. Freed, Grounds for
Divorce in the American Jurisdictions(as of June 1, 1974), 8 FAM. L.Q. 401 (1974). Only
12 states had followed California's lead and eliminated all fault provisions, permitting
divorce solely on the allegation of an irreconcilable breakdown of the marriage. Id. at
421. The remaining 33 states had simply added some form of no-fault to their existing
divorce codes. Id. at 421-23.
The five states that retained fault as the sole basis for divorce were slow to join the
rush to no-fault. South Dakota, the last state to enact no-fault divorce legislation, did
not do so until 1985. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-2 (Supp. 1989).
39. See, e.g., H. CLARK, JR., SECOND EDITION, supra note 26, at 619-22; L. WEITZMAN,
THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR

143-183 (1985); Krauskopf, Maintenance: A Decade
of Development, 50 Mo. L. REV. 259 (1985).
40. For example, the pertinent New York statute in 1787 stated that "the chancellor
shall and may [upon the dissolution of a marriage] take such order . . . touching the
maintenance of the wife . . . as from the circumstances of the parties, and the nature of
WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA
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the fault requirement, however, courts began to use their equitable powers to develop various alternatives to permanent ali42
mony, such as rehabilitative alimony,"' restitutionary alimony,
and lump sum awards,4 3 most of which had become part of the
common law in several states by 1975. These new types of
spousal support awards further blurred the distinction between
alimony and property distribution upon divorce."'
Simultaneously, the steadily increasing opportunities for
women to work in the open market meant that by 1975 a woman
faced a genuine choice between being an economically independent or an economically dependent spouse.4 5 In addition, antethe case, may be proper and sufficient." 1787 N.Y. Laws 69. More than two hundred
years later, the pertinent New York statute states,
In any action or proceeding brought . . . for a divorce, the court may direct
either spouse to provide suitably for the support of the other as, in the court's
discretion, justice requires, having regard to the length of time of the marriage,
the ability of each spouse to be self supporting, the circumstances of the case
and of the respective parties.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (Part A) (McKinney 1986)..
Prior to 1970, American alimony statutes all took one of two fundamental forms. In
1935, to take a representative year, the statutes of 30 states directed the courts simply to
make whatever alimony award it considered "just," "reasonable," or "proper" (or other
similar language) given the "circumstances" or the "nature of the case." 2 C. VERNIER,
AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 107 (1932 & Supp. 1938). The statutes of 18 other states listed
a variety of factors for the courts to take into account in making alimony awards, but
provided neither definitions of any of the factors nor any formulas or rules for balancing
them. All of these multi-factor statutes either explicitly directed the court to consider
any other factors it thought necessary for making a just award or did not appear to limit
the court to a consideration of the factor or factors listed. In all but three states, the
statutes left the amount and duration of any maintenance award to the complete discretion of the court. Id. See also Vernier & Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and its Present Statutory Structure, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 203-04
(1939).
41. See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 283 So. 2d 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Kover v.
Kover, 29 N.Y.2d 408, 278 N.E.2d 886 328 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1972); In re Marriage of Watrous, 23 Or. App. 241, 541 P.2d 1082 (1975).
42. This new form of alimony arose simultaneously with the common law governing
professional degrees as property, and was therefore a bit later in coming than the others.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979); see also H. CLARK, JR., SECOND EDITION, supra note 26,
at 651.
43. See, e.g., Hall v. Hall, 18 Ill. App. 3d 583, 310 N.E.2d 186 (1974); Reed v. Reed,
457 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. 1969), afJ'd, 484 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931
(1973). The statutes of many states have since authorized the payment of alimony either
as periodic payments or as a lump sum. H. CLARK, JR., SECOND EDITION, supra note 26, at
653-54 & n.16.
44. See, e.g., H. CLARK, JR., SECOND EDITION, supra note 26, at 589-708; J. KRAUSKOPF,
CASES ON PROPERTY DIVISION AT MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION (1984); L. WEITZMAN, supra note

39 at 70-183; Krauskopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal Support: Searching for
Solutions to the Mystery 23 FAM. L. Q. 253 (1989).
45. By 1975, 57% of all never-married women, 44.4% of all married women, and
40.8% of all widowed, divorced, or separated women had jobs in the open market. 1 U.S.
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nuptial and other private contracts altering the economic terms
of the marriage contract had become more acceptable and enforceable by 1975;"' the law was gradually moving toward the
view that many of the economic terms of the marriage contract
were merely "default" provisions around which spouses ought to
be free formally to contract. Thus, spouses began to have the
choice to specify in writing their preferences regarding, for example, spousal support and the distribution of property upon divorce and to expect these agreements, if reasonable, to be
enforced.47
As a result of the above developments, by 1975 spouses faced
several decisions that, to varying degrees, could be affected by
knowledge of the economic terms of the marriage contract. Of
these, perhaps the least plausibly influenced would be the decision to marry itself. Modern decisions about whether, whom,
and when to marry are the product of a vast array of information and speculation about one's self and one's spouse, scarcely
any of which is likely to be about the law. Indeed, our modern
culture's notion of romantic love as the basis of marriage makes
it improbable that knowledge of the economic terms of the marriage contract would alone cause many persons to decide not to
DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS DERIVED FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY: A DATABOOK, at 708-09 (1982). While the percentages of never-married and wid-

owed/divorced/separated women employed have remained fairly constant over time, the
percentage of married women employed outside the home has increased steadily: 23.8%
in 1950, 30.5% in 1960, 40.8% in 1970, and 50.1% in 1980. Id; see also V. FUCHS,
WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY (1988); ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE FOR WOMEN
(J. Chapman ed. 1976); R. TSUCHIGANE & N. DODGE, ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (1974).
46. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 257 So. 2d
530 (Fla. 1972), is usually considered the pioneering case establishing the validity of antenuptial agreements concerning post-divorce economics. Prior to 1975, many other
courts followed Posner. See, e.g., Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972);
Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102,
506 P.2d 719 (1973).
For general discussions of the growing legal acceptability of antenuptial contracts, see,
e.g., H. CLARK, JR., SECOND EDITION, supra note 26, at 1-20; Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 141 (1979); Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26 MIAMI L.
REV. 692 (1972); Oldham, PremaritalContracts Are Now Enforceable, Unless ... , 21
Hous. L. REV. 757 (1984); Schultz, Contractual Orderingof Marriage:A New Model for
State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204 (1982); Wadlington, The United States: Continuing
Reform to Reflect Social and Economic Realities, 26 J. FAM. L. 237, 239-40 (1987-88).
47. Even after Posner, courts have found particularly troublesome those contracts in
which the economically dependent spouse waives her right to post-divorce financial support. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the Illinois court followed Posner in Volid, 6
Ill. App. 3d at 386, 286 N.E.2d at 42, it held the agreement in Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill. App.
3d 83, 320 N.E.2d 506 (1974) invalid because it provided that the wife waived all claims
for alimony or support if the marriage should, be dissolved within seven years. See also,
H. CLARK, JR., SECOND EDITION, supra note 26, at 8-10.
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marry, or to marry someone else, or to marry later. Nonetheless,
consistent with the old saw, "It is as easy to fall in love with a
rich person as a poor person," one might imagine that, at the
margin, such knowledge could affect the spousal search behavior
of some persons.4 s
Knowledge of the economic terms of the marriage contract
more plausibly would affect the various life choices made during
marriage which are to some extent influenced by economic considerations and which can substantially affect one's economic
condition in case of divorce. Among the most prominent of these
choices are whether to be a full-time homemaker or to have a
career in the open market, how many children to have and when
to have them, and how long to stay out of the work force following the birth of a child.
Several empirical studies conducted after the enactment of
no-fault divorce laws have reported that in the first year following divorce from the husband, who has traditionally been the
family's principal wage earner, the typical wife suffers a drastic
decline in her standard of living while her ex-spouse enjoys a
substantial increase.4" Professor Lenore Weitzman has con48. For interesting theoretical discussions on how economic incentives can affect
spousal search behavior, see, e.g., G. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981); Becker,
A Theory of Marriage, in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY: MARRIAGE, CHILDREN, AND HUMAN
CAPITAL 299 (T. Schultz ed. 1974); Bishop, 'Is He Married?':Marriage as Information, 34
U. TORONTO L.J. 245 (1984); Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; Or, "I Gave
Him the Best Years of My Life," 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267 (1987).
49. Lenore Weitzman's findings are probably the best known. See Jacob, Faulting
No-Fault, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 773, 773 n.1 (listing general media coverage given
L. WEITZMAN, supra note 39). Weitzman interviewed 114 divorced men and 114 divorced
women in Los Angeles County in 1978 and compared their pre-divorce standard of living
in 1977 to their standard of living one year after the divorce. She concluded, "when
income is compared to needs, divorced men experience an average 42 percent rise in
their standard of living in the first year after the divorce, while divorced women . . .
experience a 73 percent decline." L. WEITZMAN, supra note 39, at 323.
Weitzman's methodology and analysis have been extensively criticized. See, e.g., Abraham, "The Divorce Revolution" Revisited: A Counter-Revolutionary Critique, 9
N.ILL.U.L.REv. 251 (1989); Emery, Book Review, 74 AM. SCIENTIST, 662 (1986); Fineman,
Illusive Equality: On Weitzman's Divorce Revolution, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 781;
Hoffman & Duncan, What Are The Economic Consequences of Divorce?, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 641 (1988); Inker, Book Review, 20 FAM. L.Q. 129 (1986); Jacob, supra, at 773; Melli,
Constructinga Social Problem: The Post-Divorce Plight of Women and Children, 1987
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 759; Mossman, Book Review, 5 CAN J. FAM. L. 341 (1986); Book
Note, 9 Harv. Women's L.J. 223 (1986). But see Weitzman, Bringing the Law Back In,
1987 AM B. FOUND. RES. J. 791.
Hoffman and Duncan suggest that Weitzman's extreme findings are the result of
mathematical error. Although Weitzman declined to provide them access to her original
data set, Hoffman and Duncan used her published data and methodology and derived an
average decline in income/needs of divorced women of 33% compared to Weitzman's
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tended that this disparity in post-divorce standards of living was
not expected by either spouse.5 0 Although there are probably
73%. Hoffman & Duncan, supra, at 643.
Other studies-using larger and more national samples, and longer time-frames-have
found smaller post-divorce standard-of-living decreases for women and increases for
men. See, e.g., Hoffman, Marital Instability and the Economic Status of Women, 14
DEMOGRAPHY 67, 69 (1977) (finding, over a 7 year period, a 6.7% standard of living decline for divorced women, a 16.5% increase for divorced men, and a 20.8% increase for
married couples); Duncan & Hoffman, Economic Consequences of Marital Instability in
HORIZONTAL EQUITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 427, 437-38, 458 (M.
David & T. Smeeding eds. 1985) (divorced women who remain unmarried experience an
income/needs ratio decline of 13% during the first year, but by the end of the fifth year
they remain down only 6%; all divorced women (including those who remarry and those
who do not) experience an average decline of 9% during the first year, but an increase of
10% by the end of the fifth year).
See also Duncan & Hoffman, A Reconsideration of the Economic Consequences of
Marital Dissolution, 22 DEMOGRAPHY 485, 491 (1985) ("In the year prior to divorce or
separation, about 5 percent of the white women and 13 percent of the black women lived
in families classified as poor [using a formula of 'income less than needs']. In the year
following a divorce or separation, these figures jump to about 11 percent for white
women and 33 percent for black women. . . .Poverty rates for all men actually fall from
six to four percent in the year after divorce.").
50. Weitzman claims that her own empirical research indicates that "both men and
women in marriages of long duration assumed that they were forming a partnership, and
both assumed that they would share equally in the fruits of their joint endeavors." L.
WEITZMAN, supra note 39, at xiii. Unfortunately, despite her assurance of supporting
data, Weitzman never provides any empirical evidence as to what-at the time of marriage or at any other time-either spouse expects the economic consequences of divorce
(or marriage) to be. Indeed, she provides no empirical support even for her specific proposition that the ordinary spouse assumes that the "fruits of their joint endeavors" will
be "share[d] equally," not only during marriage, but after divorce. But cf. Note, Individual Entitlement to the FinancialBenefits of a ProfessionalDegree: An EmpiricalStudy
of the Attitudes and Expectations of Married ProfessionalStudents and their Spouses,
22 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 333 (1989) (authored by Rebecca Redosh Eisner and Ruth Zimmerman) (finding that spouses believe that an individual who supports her spouse through
professional school should be compensated at divorce).
The closest Weitzman comes to offering evidence for the latter assertion is her brief
theorizing about the "alimony myth." L. WEITZMAN, supra note 39, at 143-45. She claims,
again with out empirical substantiation, that "[u]ntil recently, folk wisdom in the United
States led one to assume that nearly every divorced woman was awarded alimony." Id. at
143; Weitzman & Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Difference?

14 FAM. L.Q. 141, 142 (1980).
Weitzman adds that this allegedly popular myth extends beyond a belief in the extreme likelihood that a woman will receive alimony, to the amount of the probable
award. She asserts the existence of a "widespread belief that ex-wives were often freed
from worldly cares while their former husbands struggled to support them in the style to
which they had become accustomed." Id. at 144. Even if true, this assertion hardly supports Weitzman's claim of a common expectation of "equal shares." Indeed, as Weitzman herself portrays it, the popular expectation is that the standard of living of the wife
will remain the same following divorce, while that of the husband will decline.
If actually held, such an expectation of course differs drastically from the reality of a
sharp decline in the post-divorce standard of living of the ex-wife, and is therefore consistent with Weitzman's claim that women's post-divorce economic decline is unexpected. But it is important to ask what the basis is for any of these alleged expectations.
Weitzman herself speculates that the source of these allegedly common expectations
has not been post-divorce spousal support law, but rather newspapers that "sensational-
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many reasons for the adverse financial condition of recently divorced women,51 the laws governing the economic consequences
of marital dissolution undoubtedly play a significant role. We
would, therefore, expect that knowledge of those laws might affect life choices such as those delineated above.
Each of those life choices, like the decision to marry itself, ultimately stems from a wide range of highly contextual and contingent factors as well as essentially personal, nonlegal concerns.
Thus, we should not overestimate the probable effect on any of
those decisions of knowledge of the economic terms of the marriage contract. Indeed, we likely find difficult to believe a scenario in which a woman tells her husband that although she would
love to have a child, she is dissuaded from doing so by her
knowledge of the child support and alimony laws and her consequent concern about what her likely economic condition would
be in case of divorce. At the margin, however, knowledge of the
laws governing the economic consequences of marital dissolution
might affect some spouses' decisionmaking. Knowledge of the
child support and alimony laws might, for example, be one factor in a spouse's decision to have only two children rather than
three, or to stay out of the workforce for five months, rather
than five years, after the birth of a child. 2
Knowledge of the law, of course, is often not the same as
knowledge of the effects of its application. An individual who
knows the text of a given state's alimony law will not necessarily
have an accurate sense of what spousal support, if any, she
would likely receive (or have to pay) upon divorce in that state.
Nonetheless, straightforward information about the formal law
might at least cause the ordinary individual to appreciate that
ized stories of seemingly exorbitant awards," books and magazines that "warned men of
the financial burdens they would endure following divorce," lawyers who "helped to perpetuate the alimony myth in the popular press by publicizing high alimony awards they
had won for their clients," and even Doonesbury comic strips. Id. at 144. Nowhere in her
discussion does Weitzman provide evidence that the law was the basis for these expectations or that the ordinary person even knew, let alone understood, the substance of the
law governing post-divorce spousal support at any time prior to divorce.
51. The reasons most frequently mentioned include: the woman is more likely to get
custody of the children and her childcare responsibilities reduce her "labor supply," see,
e.g., Duncan & Hoffman, supra note 49, at 495; the woman is more likely to have been
responsible for childcare when the couple was married, resulting in reduced past human
capital investment as compared to the man, see, e.g., L. WEITZMAN, supra note 39, at 342;
and outright discrimination in the labor market, see, e.g., id.; Duncan & Hoffman, supra
note 49, at 495.
52. Knowledge of both those laws and the possibility of contracting around them,
might instead cause one to contract with one's spouse before or during marriage about
the economic issues surrounding divorce.

WINTER 1990]

Marriage Contract

she cannot predict the effect of divorce in this area. The woman
who prepares to marry, confident that in the case of divorce she
will be entitled to alimony sufficient to keep her at the standard
of living established during her marriage, will be able to see that
the text of the relevant law provides her no such guarantee. And
that information might influence some of her subsequent
decisionmaking.
Finally, knowledge of the economic terms of the marriage contract most plausibly would affect the decision whether to enter
into a formal, written agreement regarding the allocation of
one's earnings and property in case of divorce. If persons applying for a marriage license knew not only the substance of the
laws governing the economic consequences of divorce but also
that they legally could contract around them, one might expect
more persons to enter into such contracts.
Although at the time of marriage many persons, especially the
young, have little property or other assets, they typically acquire
more over the course of the marriage. Thus, although some individuals may not feel a need prior to marriage to enter into a
formal contract concerning the distribution of their property
upon divorce, they might have substantial interest in doing so
some years later. Given our society's diversity of accepted lifestyles and household economies (dual-career versus "traditional"
marriages, to take just two examples), as well as the increased
likelihood of divorce, one might expect substantial variation in
individuals' preferred marital property relationships. One might
therefore also expect individuals to find unsatisfactory, and to
contract around, any single default arrangement. 3
Providing information is one of the least intrusive ways the
State has of attempting to channel citizen behavior. And the
goal (if not always the result) of this form of "regulation" is
surely among the least controversial: increasing the autonomy
and liberty of the individual by increasing the information upon
53. Finally, the dissolution of a marriage necessitates the division of the spouses'
property. In most states, each spouse retains sole ownership over her separate property,
see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(c) (Supp. 1989), and it is left to the court to divide
the marital property either "equally" see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1989);
WIs. STAT. § 767.255 (1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11 (West 1987) (equal division a
rebuttable presumption), or "equitably," see, e.g., Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (Supp.
1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1989). As in the case of alimony, the
statutes of several states further provide the court a list of factors to consider when
making an "equitable" distribution of the marital property. See, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 125.150(1) (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1987). In a few states, all the property
owned by either spouse is vulnerable to division upon divorce. See H. CLARK, JR., SECOND
EDITION, supra note 26, at 590-91.
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which his decisions are based. As attempts to introduce "informed consent" into citizens' medical decisionmaking have
taught us, however, the goal of greater self-determination is also
among the most elusive: 5" A legally mandated informational
right easily becomes a rite. And more information need not lead
to better understanding.
There is, in short, no guarantee that more informed, let alone
objectively "better," decisions of any sort would result from a
state providing information about the economic terms of the
marriage contract to license applicants. For we have no objective
standard by which to judge the "goodness" of individual life
choices. It is plausible, however, that disclosure of this information might cause some persons to make some of those decisions
differently. And greater information is surely a necessary first
step toward more informed, and ultimately more autonomous,
decisions.
B. Public Knowledge of the Economic Terms of the
Marriage Contract
As we have seen, knowledge of the economic terms of the marriage contract had substantial ex ante utility by 1975. If the average individual contemplating marriage already had a sound
knowledge of those laws, however, there would be scant reason
for the State to promulgate them more aggressively than usual.
Thus, one would expect that at the time Louisiana enacted its
unusual disclosure requirement, the ordinary person approaching first marriage55 knew little of the laws governing the economic consequences of the decision to marry.
54.

For discussion of the difficulties the legal system faces in attempting to provide

for meaningful and effective "informed consent," see, e.g., R.
STRANGERS:

THE RULE OF LAW

BEAUCHAMP &

N.

KING,

A

IN DOCTOR-PATIENT

BURT, TAKING CARE OF

RELATIONS

(1979); R.

FADEN,

T.

HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986); J. KATZ,

(1984).
55. My focus throughout this Article is on persons who have not previously been
married. Persons who have already been divorced should have some knowledge of the
law governing the economic consequences of divorce at the time they remarry, although
their knowledge may be of the law of another state or of outdated laws of the same state.
Of persons who married in the U.S. in 1975, 22.5% of the women and 24.1% of the
THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT

men had previously been divorced. 3 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, VITAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1975, at table 1-10 (1979). In 1985, the most recent
year for which official statistics are available, 28.0% of the women and 28.8% of the men
had previously been divorced. 3 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 34,

table 1-11.
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There are no published studies of the ordinary person's
knowledge, at the time of first marriage, of the economic terms
of the marriage contract. There seems little reason to believe,
however, that the public would demonstrate greater understanding of this area of the law than of the other "everyday life" areas
for which published studies exist."' Those few empirical studies
indicate that as of 1975 the ordinary person knew little of the
law that governed her personal interactions. In a 1966 interview
survey, 300 Austin, Texas, households were asked 30 yes-or-no
questions about Texas civil law in the areas of housing, welfare,
civil rights of racial minorities, civil liberties, consumer law, and
family law.17 The mean overall score was 16 of 30 correct (54%),
scarcely better than chance. 58
Similarly poor knowledge of the law was demonstrated in a
1973 mail survey in which 600 Michigan residents5 9 were asked
22 true-false questions, primarily about criminal and consumer
law. The mean overall score was approximately 15 of 22 correct
(68%), with the mean number of correct answers in the consumer law section being only a fraction better than chance (53%
correct).6 0 Scores on the criminal law section were somewhat
better (a mean of about 77% correct). 1
These data, although admittedly sparse, suggest that at the
time of the Louisiana legislation the ordinary American probably did not have much knowledge of the law likely to affect everyday life. The absence of special efforts by any state to convey
information about the laws of which the marriage contract is
56. See generally Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 443; Williams & Hall, Knowledge
of the Law in Texas: Socioeconomic and Ethnic Differences, 7 LAW & Soc'v REV. 99
(1972); Note, Legal Knowledge of Michigan Citizens, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1463 (1973).
By public knowledge of the law, I do not mean to include public knowledge of, for
example, the sanctions that attach to various crimes. I am interested only in studies that
measure the ordinary person's knowledge of whether a particular action is prohibited by
the criminal law or subjects the actor to liability under the civil law. Thus, the vast
majority of studies of public knowledge of the criminal law, which focus on the deterrent
effects of various sanctions as well as public perceptions of sanctions, are not relevant.
The three studies listed above appear to be the only published surveys of public knowledge of the law, thus described.
57. Williams & Hall, supra note 56, at 101-02. Unfortunately, the published report of
the survey does not provide the wording of the "family law" questions.
58. Id. at 113. The mean number of correct answers ranged from approximately 19 of
30 correct (63%) for "High Income Anglos" to 13 of 30 correct (43%) for both "Low
Income Negroes" and "Low Income Mexicans." Id.
59. Survey questionnaires were mailed to 600 Michigan residents, and the response
rate was 64.2%, or 385 questionnaires returned. Note, supra note 56, at 1466.
60. Id. at 1468.
61. Id.
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comprised makes it unlikely that a study of public knowledge of
those laws would have yielded substantially different results.
Nor does it seem that the ordinary person considered marriage a life choice about which to consult an attorney for pertinent legal information. Notwithstanding the poor knowledge of
the law that the ordinary person apparently possessed, few
Americans prior to 1975 ever consulted an attorney on a personal, non-business matter. The largest study to date in this
area, a nationwide 1974 American Bar Association survey"2
(ABA survey) of more than 2,000 adults,63 found that 36% had
never consulted an attorney on a personal matter and another
28% had done so only once.6 4 The few earlier studies found comparably little consulting of lawyers by the public.6 5
The ABA survey revealed that the most common uses of attorneys by the public for nonbusiness matters were for real estate transactions and the settling of estates; divorces and other
matrimonial disputes were third. 6 A 1970 Texas study found a
similar hierarchy of uses, with land title (30%) and estate transactions (16.9%) being the most common subjects of attorney
contact, and divorce matters (10.7%) again occupying third
67
place.
Although both the ABA and Texas surveys found that attorneys were frequently consulted on matrimonial matters, 8 this
was only when divorce was imminent or already had occurred.
There is no evidence that any substantial number of persons
consulted an attorney shortly prior to marriage in order to obtain information about the terms of the marriage contract.6 9 (In62.
SURVEY

B.

CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL

(1977).

63. The sampling procedure is set out at id. 32-41. Anyone 18 years of age or older
was considered an "adult." Id. at xxxv, 32.
64. Id. at 186, 190.
65. A 1970 survey of 788 Texans found that 40.7% had never consulted an attorney.
Those surveyed were 17 years of age or older. Bar Attitudinal Study Completed, Results
Published for First Time, 34 TEX. B.J. 13, 13 (1971) [hereinafter Texas Bar Survey I];
Use of Lawyers at All-Time High But Serious 'Knowledge Gap' Exists, 34 TEX. B.J. 105
(1971) [hereinafter Texas Bar Survey II].
A 1960 study of 2,500 non-lawyers in Missouri revealed that only 33% had used an
attorney for what they considered to be a personal matter. MISSOURI BAR, MISSOURI BAR
PRENTICE-HALL SURVEY: A MOTIVATIONAL STUDY OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND LAW OFFICE

35 (1963).
66. B. CURRAN, supra note 62, at 196.
67. Texas Bar Survey II, supra note 65, at 105.
68. B. CURRAN, supra note 62, at 218-19 n.27; Texas Bar Survey II, supra note 65, at
105.
69. Extrapolating from the ABA survey figures, it seems improbable that many persons contemplating marriage consulted an attorney for any type of advice, let alone inMANAGEMENT
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deed, this pattern of usage is consistent with the anecdotal evidence that there have long been many "divorce lawyers," but
one has heard of rather fewer "marriage lawyers.")
C. Deterrents to Information Acquisition
As of 1975, then, the ordinary person at the time of first marriage was likely to have little knowledge of the economic terms
of the marriage contract. Why was she so untroubled by her ignorance that she did not seek out expert assistance?
One possibility is that in considering whether to acquire this
information prior to marriage, the typical spouse-to-be determined that the costs of obtaining it were likely to exceed any
foreseeable benefits of doing so. It is not clear, however, that
someone without information can accurately judge ex ante how
useful that information might prove. Indeed, someone without
particular information may not even be aware that the information exists to be obtained. Thus, were there cause to believe that
the ordinary individual might be prevented by misinformation,
erroneous beliefs, or systematic cognitive errors from carrying
out an accurate cost-benefit analysis in this area, the State
would have further reason to inform all license applicants of the
economic terms of the marriage contract.
At the time of the Louisiana legislation, the ordinary person
quite possibly held one or more of four erroneous beliefs, which
might partially explain why she apparently knew so little about
the economic terms of the marriage contract at the time she entered into it and why she was so untroubled by her ignorance
that she did not seek legal counsel: "I know what the law is;"
"Marriage is not a legal contract;" "Marriage is not a problem
for a lawyer;" and "It won't happen to me."
1. "I know what the law is"- State disclosure of the economic terms of the marriage contract might result not only in
more-informed, but in genuinely better-informed, decisions if
formation as to the economic terms and consequences of the marriage contract. Census
figures for 1974, the year of the ABA study, reported that 83% of adults over the age of
18 had been married at least once. B. CURRAN, supra note 62, at 59-60 (citing 1974 Census). Of the 66% of adults surveyed by the ABA who had ever used an attorney, 56% of
those users had done so on more than one occasion. Id. at 185, 190. Because an estate or
a real property transaction is the most likely reason for a first visit to an attorney, id. at
196; Texas Bar Survey H, supra note 65, at 105, no more than 30.7% (.56 x .66 x .83) of
married adults were even vaguely plausible candidates for having consulted an attorney
prior to marriage for advice or information concerning marriage. Even this figure is likely
higher than our common experience might lead us to expect.
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there were reason to believe that the ordinary person's expectations regarding the law were at odds with reality. That is, if an
individual believes she is knowledgeable when in fact she is not,
providing information that enables her to recognize the erroneousness of her belief might enable her to make decisions that are
not only different from the ones she might have made without
that information, but are in reality better because they are made
on the basis of fact rather than myth.
Some evidence indicates that alimony, or post-divorce spousal
support, is one area in which the ordinary person believes herself to be knowledgeable about the economic terms of the marriage contract when in fact she is not. Sociologists Lenore Weitzman and Ruth Dixon assert that "folk wisdom about divorce in
the United States has assumed that 'nearly every woman who
asks for alimony gets it.' "7 The reality, however, is that postdivorce spousal support is, and has always been, awarded in a
small percentage of divorces. 71 Hence the existence of what
70. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 50, at 142; see also L.
at 143.

WEITZMAN,

supra note 39,

71.
The U.S. Census Bureau collected national data on alimony awards between
1887 and 1922 and found that only 9.3 percent of divorces between 1887 and
1906 included provisions for permanent alimony, as did 15.4 percent of those in
1916, and 14.6 percent of those in 1922.
L. WEITZMAN, supra note 39, at 180-81; see also P. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND

DIVORCE 127 (1959).
More recent U.S. Census data indicate that little has changed in more than 60 years.
Only 14.6% (2.8 million) of the 19.16 million ever-divorced or currently separated
women, as of spring 1986, were awarded or had an agreement to receive alimony. U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-23, No. 154, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1985 (Supplemental Report) 6 (1989).
See also E. MAY, GREAT EXPECTATIONS: MARRIAGE & DIVORCE IN POST-VICTORIAN
AMERICA 151 (1980) (In Los Angeles in 1920, 60% of requests for alimony granted, which
represented 32% of all divorces.); Bell, Alimony and the FinanciallyDependent Spouse
in Montgomery County, Maryland, 22 FAM. L.Q. 225, 267-68 (1988) (of 86 contested adjudications in Montgomery County in 1986, alimony was awarded in 38% (indefinate
alimony in 22%); alimony was awarded in only 11.3% (indefinate alimony in 4%) of the
354 cases in which the plaintiff was represented by one of 26 attorneys who had represented 10 or more plaintiffs in divorce cases in Montgomery County in 1986); McLindon,
Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 21
FAM. L.Q. 351, 362 (1987) (alimony of more than $1 awarded in 59% of random sample of
102 divorce cases filed in New Haven, Connecticut, in 1970-71; in 30% of random sample
of 100 divorce cases filed in New Haven in 1982-83); Rowe & Morrow, The Economic
Consequences of Divorce in Oregon After Ten or More Years of Marriage,24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 463, 476 (1988) (Sample of divorce decrees of marriages of 10 or more years
duration granted between July 1983 and June 1984 in three urban Oregon counties re-
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Weitzman and Dixon have termed the "alimony myth." 72
Although they present no empirical support for their claim of
public over-estimation of the frequency with which alimony is
awarded, Professors Weitzman and Dixon provide plausible anecdotal evidence. They observe that the popular press has sensationalized stories of seemingly exorbitant spousal support
awards (often with the encouragement of the winning lawyers)
and that numerous books and magazines warn men of the financial burdens they will endure following divorce.7 3
Although Weitzman and Dixon do not discuss the "alimony
myth" in the context of decision theory, their speculation about
the probable source of the myth (assuming that the erroneous
belief is as widely held as they maintain) is supported by the
vealed 32 of 116 wives (27.5%) received orders of spousal support; only 14 of 116 (12%)
wives received awards of "permanent" alimony.); White & Stone, A Study of Alimony
and Child Support Rulings with Some Recommendations, 10 FAM. L.Q. 75, 80 (1976)
(Sample of 532 divorce decrees granted between July 1, 1971 through 1974 in Orange
County, Florida, revealed alimony awards in 24.43% of cases; permanent alimony was
awarded in only 5.8% of cases.); Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study,
20 FAM. L.Q. 79, 85, 88 (1986) (Sample of 227 divorce decrees granted between October
1982 through February 1983 in four Vermont Superior Court districts revealed alimony
awards in only 6.7% of cases; permanent alimony was awarded in fewer than 2% of
cases.).
One must be careful when interpreting such statistics. The low percentage of alimony
awards need not imply any anti-female bias or general unwillingness of courts to enter
spousal support orders. First, it is often unclear how many divorcing women surveyed
requested alimony. In addition, it is possible that the low award rate accurately represents the proportion of divorces in which the primary wage-earner had an income sufficient to provide a reasonable degree of spousal support without reducing his subsequent
net income below the poverty line.
Indeed, Weitzman's own interviews in 1978 with 218 divorced men and women in Los
Angeles County revealed a direct relationship between husband's income and alimony
awards. While only 15% of the men who earned less than $20,000 a year were ordered to
pay alimony, 62% of those who earned $30,000 or more were thus ordered. L. WEITZMAN,
supra note 39, at 179, 181. Weitzman concluded:
Obviously the alimony "myth" is not a myth for upper-middle-class families.
But it is a myth for the families of most divorced men-men who earn less than
$20,000 a year. Since only 17 percent of the divorced men in the 1977 random
sample of divorce decrees reported gross incomes of over $20,000 a year, it is the
other 83 percent of the men-those who are, in fact, the typical divorced
men-whom judges view as incapable of supporting two households, and therefore unable to pay alimony.
Thus alimony is typically not awarded because judges do not perceive it as
"possible" in those families that constitute the vast majority of the divorcing
population. As one judge remarked during a contempt hearing, "You can't
squeeze blood from a stone."
Id. at 181-82.
72. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 50, at 141; L. WEITZMAN, supra note 39, at 143;
see also discussion supra note 50.
73. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 50, at 142-43; L. WEITZMAN, supra note 39, at 14344.
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work of some scholars of cognitive illusions. According to Tversky and Kahneman, a general inferential rule, or heuristic, that
people commonly employ is "availability": We tend to judge an
event's occurrence as likely or frequent if instances of it are easy
to imagine or recall."4
As Weitzman and Dixon note, the popular press seldom
records a denial of spousal support; rather, the press considers
the unusually large awards most newsworthy. Thus, availability
theories of judgmental biases predict that people will systematically overestimate the frequency of alimony awards, especially,
large awards. In fact, the biases in newspaper coverage and people's judgments have been found empirically to be quite
similar. 5

Misled by her own judgmental biases and by what she reads in
the popular press, a woman may believe she knows the law governing post-divorce spousal support. She therefore may not in-

vestigate that law further at the time of marriage or before making other decisions for which the information might be
pertinent. Indeed, if she likes the knowledge that she thinks she

has, she may be especially reluctant to expend resources acquiring what could only turn out to be "bad news."

The prevalence of the alleged "alimony myth" may be called
into question by the fact that divorced persons with a first-hand

knowledge of the alimony laws and their application constitute
an increasingly large portion of the population. 6 We would

therefore expect greater numbers of never divorced people to be
children of divorced parents or to know personally someone with
first-hand stories of the economic consequences of divorce.
74. Tversky & Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability,5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1973); see also Borgida & Nisbett, The Differential Impact of Abstract vs. Concrete Information on Decisions, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 258 (1977); Markus & Zajonc, The Cognitive Perspective in Social Psychology,
in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 137, 181-82 (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson 3d ed.
1985); Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall & Reed, PopularInduction: Information Is Not Necessarily Informative, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 113, 128-29 (J. Carroll & J.
Payne eds. 1976); Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Facts Versus Fears: Understanding
Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 465-72
(D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982).
75. Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, supra note 74, at 467-68.
76. The proportion of the U.S. population 18 years of age and older that is divorced
has grown steadily from 3.2% in 1970, to 6.2% in 1980, and 7.8% in 1987. U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1989, at 42 (109th ed.
1989).
The proportion of the U.S. population 18 years of age and older that is divorced was a
mere 0.6% in 1910, 1.3% in 1930, and 2.4% in 1950. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, Part 1, Series A-160171, at 20-21 (1975).
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Would we not expect information about alimony laws that is acquired in this way to be even more "available" to the ordinary
person than magazine stories about Johnny Carson's wives?
Certainly we would expect the judges and attorneys who specialize in domestic relations law to have highly accurate information regarding all aspects of post-divorce maintenance awards
and therefore not to be susceptible to the "alimony myth." In a
1975 survey of 92 lawyers and 26 judges in Los Angeles County,
however, Professors Weitzman and Dixon obtained direct empirical support for the existence of the alimony myth: Both judges
and attorneys were found to have a greatly exaggerated sense of
the frequency with which post-divorce spousal support is
awarded.
The lawyers interviewed estimated, on the average, that twothirds of all "currently divorcing" women are awarded maintenance, while the judges, all of whom hear family law cases in the
greater Los Angeles area, estimated that maintenance was
awarded to "more than half" of those women. 77 In fact, a random sample of 1,000 final divorce decrees granted in 1972 in Los
Angeles and San Francisco counties revealed that only 15% of
wives actually were awarded spousal support.78 Alimony was
awarded to 17% of wives in a similar sample of Los Angeles
county divorce decrees granted in 1977. 79
77. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 50, at 143; L. WEITZMAN, supra note 39, at 144.
Unfortunately, the discrepancy between the estimates of those surveyed and the actual
award rates are difficult to interpret because the researchers do not reprint the question
actually posed. Thus, part of the apparent overestimation by judges and attorneys of the
frequency of awards may be the result of those interviewed including nominal awards of
$1.00 in their estimates, a type of award not counted by Weitzman and Dixon in calculating the percentage of divorcing women who receive maintenance awards. Weitzman &
Dixon, supra note 50, at 143 n.8, 144 & n.10.
In addition, those surveyed may have provided estimates which accurately reflected
the cases with which they were personally familiar. That is, perhaps judges and attorneys
come into contact with a disproportionate number of middle- and upper-income divorces
in which a spousal support award is feasible, and have disproportionately little contact
with low-income divorces in which no spousal support award is possible. Indeed, Weitzman and Dixon note that
[H]igher income husbands are seen as capable of paying alimony, and have typically been ordered to do so. While these families are not numerous, they disproportionately contribute to both the contested caseload and the appellate
caseload. Thus, legal norms and judicial standards are more likely to be based on
them.
• . . [T]he persistence of the alimony myth is largely due to the visibility of
middle- and high-income divorce cases. It is their divorce cases which make case
law, generate publicity, and form the basis for the folk wisdom about alimony
and divorce.
Id. at 182 (emphasis in original).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Because there is little reason to believe that the ordinary person at the time of first marriage would have more accurate general knowledge of maintenance awards than the judges and attorneys who specialize in domestic relations law, the existence of
the "alimony myth"-if not also its cause-would seem to be at
least indirectly verified by Weitzman and Dixon's survey.
2. "Marriageis not a legal contract"- If one does not view
a matter as involving the law, one is unlikely to seek knowledge
of the relevant law. Certainly, the legal procedure for getting
married has never given spouses much reason to think that they
are entering into a contract, let alone one whose economic provisions are alterable and might be relevant to subsequent life
choices such as how many children to have or whether to be a
full-time homemaker.
In order to marry, it has long been the case that the spousesto-be must obtain a license from the state by providing medical
and other personal information and paying a small fee."0 In the
majority of states, applicants must wait for a period ranging
from twenty-four hours to five days before the State issues the
marriage license."1 If both parties meet the statutory requirements regarding age, s" gender," and the absence of an existing
marriage8 4 or of an unduly close biological relationship to one
another,8 5 they then need only take part in a brief ceremony
conducted by an authorized official to be deemed legally married.86 Prior to 1975, no state took steps to inform persons about
to be married of any of the terms of the marriage contract. Nor
has any state yet required license applicants to provide evidence
80.

See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-1-10 (1984 & Supp. 1989) (enacted 1890);

VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-1 to 20-16 (1983 & Supp. 1989) (enacted 1919).

81. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-220 (Law Co-op. 1985) (24 hours) (enacted 1911);
WIs. STAT. § 765.08 (1987-88) (5 days) (enacted 1917). As of December 31, 1979, the last
date for which the Council of State Governments compiled such statistics, ony 20 jurisdictions (19 states and Puerto Rico) had no statutory waiting period before issuance of a
marriage license, and five of those instead had a statutory waiting period after issuance
of the license. 23 COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1980-81 46.
82. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-1-9 (1984) (enacted 1877); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-48 (1983 & Supp. 1989) (enacted 1919).
83. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-103 (1987) (enacted 1947); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-45.2 (1983) (enacted 1919).
84. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-1-8 (1984) (enacted 1877); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-38.1(a)(1) & 43 (1983) (enacted 1919).
85. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-1-6 (1984) (enacted 1877); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-38.1(a)(2) & (3) (1983) (enacted 1919).
86. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-1-29 (1984) (enacted 1877); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-23, 20-25, 20-26 (1983 & Supp. 1989) (enacted 1919).
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that they know and understand the legal consequences of their
decision to marry. 7
Thus, the ordinary individual's ignorance and lack of curiosity
regarding the economic provisions of the marriage contract may
in part result from her failure to appreciate that marriage is a
transaction with numerous legal consequences, that marriage is
the signing of a legal contract.
3. "Marriageis not a problem for a lawyer"- Another reason why the average individual may not consult a lawyer prior to
marriage is that she thinks of lawyers as problem solvers and
does not think of marriage as a problem, least of all a problem
for which she needs a lawyer. Several surveys of public use of
lawyers have found that the ordinary person has a very circumscribed view of what lawyers do. This popularly held, narrow
conception of the lawyer's role may in part explain the low frequency with which the average individual consults them in general, and particularly in anticipation of marriage.
A 1960 Missouri Bar study, for example, found that the ordinary person does not view the lawyer as someone to consult for
information about the law, but rather as someone to go to when
one has a grievance to be litigated. Those surveyed were asked,
"When you think of a lawyer, what type of legal services which
[sic] he performs first comes to your mind?"88 Respondents who
had previously used a lawyer, as well as those who had not,
listed "accident and damage suits" as the most common service
performed by an attorney. 9 Given this narrow view of lawyers'
work, it is not surprising that those surveyed perceived few of
life's events or decisions to require the assistance of a lawyer.9 0
87. In this regard, most states' procedures for obtaining a driver's license, which include tests of both one's ability to operate an automobile and one's knowledge of the
"rules of the road," are typically far more demanding than those for obtaining a marriage
license. Compare, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-369 & 46.1-349 (1986) (examination of applicants for driver's license) with id. § 20-13 to 20-49 (1983 & Supp. 1989) (procedures
and requirements for marriage).
88. MISSOURI BAR, supra note 65, at 36.
89. Id.
90. When those who had never consulted a lawyer were asked why, 80% responded
that they "had never felt the need" for such services. Id. at 34-35.
Similarly, a 1949 study, E. Koos, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW; THE REPORT OF A STUDY OF
FAMILY NEEDS As RELATED TO LEGAL SERVICES; MADE FOR THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2d ed. 1952), asked 2,050 "working-class" and 4,150 "middle-class" families in
six American cities, "What is the major function of the lawyer?" Both classes overwhelming responsed, "defending people who are presumed [sic] to have violated the
law." Id. at 3-4, 8-9. The researchers concluded that both working- and middle-class
respondents had a "tendency to see the lawyer as one who in one way or another protects
the individual from that awesome (and possibly gruesome) thing called 'the law.'" Id.
at 9.
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Even if a person does view marriage as a "problem" for which
a lawyer might provide useful information or advice, she may
not consult one. Eighty-three percent of those surveyed in the
1974 ABA study, for example, agreed with the statement that
"[a] lot of people do not go to lawyers because they have no way
of knowing which lawyer is competent to handle their particular
problem."9' 1 In addition, 44% of those questioned in the same
survey agreed that "a person should not call upon a lawyer until
he has exhausted every other possible way of solving his problem."9 2 This sentiment may in part stem from a perception of
lawyers as dilatory. Fifty-nine percent of respondents in the
same survey agreed with the statement that "[1]awyers are (not)
prompt about getting things done."9' 3
The anticipated cost of legal services may also deter some
from consulting an attorney. Fifty-one percent of those surveyed
by the ABA agreed that "Lawyers' fees are (not) usually fair to
their clients, regardless of how they figured the fee."9 4 Sixtyeight percent believed that "[miost lawyers charge more for
their services than they are worth. '95 Those surveyed in the Missouri Bar study, however, were more sanguine about the cost of
legal services: Less than 1.5% of those who said they had never
used a lawyer gave financial reasons as the cause.9
4. "It won't happen to me"- Finally, the ordinary individual about to be married may not be curious about those economic provisions of the marriage contract that are pertinent
only in case of divorce because she simply cannot imagine that
her marriage will not last forever. Social scientists have in fact
91. B. CURRAN, supra note 62, at 228. As Curran notes, however, this survey question
must be carefully interpreted: "The 83% who agreed that the vagaries of the lawyer
selection process inhibited others may or may not have been reflecting an uneasiness of
their own." Id. at 228-29 (emphasis in original).
92. Id. at 228.
93. Id. at 229.
94. Id. at 231.
95. Id.
96. MIssouR BAR, supra note 65, at 35.
The 1949 Koos study in contrast, found different reasons for why persons do not consult a lawyer. Those surveyed were asked whether they had ever consulted an attorney
for any of 30 problems for which an ordinary person might do so. Those who responded
that they had experienced one of the listed problems but had not consulted an attorney
were asked for the reason. Those most often given by the middle-class respondents were:
"always 'work things out by ourselves'" (20%); "lawyer known to have been too costly or
unsatisfactory for others" (15.9%); and "unable to afford fees" (12.3%). The workingclass respondents, in contrast, listed "unable to afford fees" 47.6% of the time. The next
most commonly given reasons were "received help from non-professional person"
(14.4%) and "didn't know that lawyer could help with problem" (10%). E. Koos, supra
note 90, at 7.
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found that people commonly view themselves as personally immune to hazards of all sorts. For example, the great majority of
individuals believe themselves to be more likely than average to
live past the age of 80,97 and less likely than average to be injured in an automobile accident" or to be harmed by products
they use.9 9 We might, therefore, expect the ordinary person also
to believe that she is more likely than average to stay married to
the same person for life.
Indeed, although our "divorce rate" has hovered near 50%
since 197510 and demographers project that at least half of current American marriages will eventually end in divorce, 10 1 more
than 80% of respondents in a five year survey (1975-80) of high
school seniors "considered it very likely or fairly likely that they
would stay married to the same person for life."' 10 Fewer than
5% of those surveyed "thought such an outcome fairly or very
unlikely. "103
One explanation for this systematic optimism is that, from the
perspective of each individual's experience, the risks genuinely
look very small. At the time of marriage, most individuals have
not been divorced.' 0 " Moreover, their indirect experience with
divorce via family, friends, news media, and the popular press
shows them that "when divorces happen, they happen to
97.

Weinstein, UnrealisticOptimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.

PERSONALITY

&

Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 806, 810 (1980).

98.

See Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers,
143 (1981).
99. Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, supra note 74, at 470 (citing A. Rethans, An
Investigation of Consumer Perceptions of Product Hazards (1979) (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Univ. of Oregon)).
100. See discussion supra note 34.
101. See, e.g., Glick, How American Families are Changing, 6 AM. DEMOGRAPHICS 20,
24 (1984) (predicting that almost 50% of marriages begun in the 1980s will end in divorce). Norton & Moorman, Current Trends in Marriage and Divorce Among American
Women, 49 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 3 (1987) (citing estimate by Census Bureau demographers that, of women born in 1946-50, 56% of first marriages will eventually end in
divorce).
102. Thornton & Freedman, Changing Attitudes Toward Marriage and Single Life,
14 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 297, 300 (1982).
103. Id.
104. For example, in 1985, the most recent year for which official statistics are available, only 28.0% of all brides and 28.8% of all grooms had previously been divorced. 3
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 34, at table 1-11.
47

ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA
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others. ' 10 5 This is yet another gloss on the "availability" heuristic of Tversky and Kahneman discussed above.' 0
Dissonance theory'0 7 provides a second possible explanation
for the apparently common unwillingness to confront-especially at the time of first marriage-the statistical fact that one
is as likely to be parted from one's spouse by divorce as by
death. 8 Cognitive dissonance is said to exist when a person possesses two contradictory thoughts or beliefs.' A basic assumption of dissonance theory is that holding conflicting cognitions is
uncomfortable, perhaps intolerable, and that people will therefore be motivated to reduce or eliminate the dissonance." 0 One
way to achieve this is to alter one of the dissonant elements so
that it is no longer inconsistent with the other cognition."'
The conflicting cognitions immediately prior to marriage,
might be "I am about to be married to the spouse of my
dreams" and "But this could all end in a miserable divorce in a
very short while." At the time of marriage, thoughts of marital
bliss are likely to be more salient than the unpleasant thought
that one might be making a mistake. The result, according to
dissonance theory, should be decreased ability to entertain
thoughts of divorce.
105.

Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein present the case of automobile driving:

Despite driving too fast, tailgating, etc., poor drivers make trip after trip without
mishap. This personal experience demonstrates to them their exceptional skill
and safety. Moreover, their indirect experience via the news media shows them
that when accidents happen, they happen to others. Given such misleading experiences, people may feel quite justified in refusing to take protective actions
such as wearing seat belts.
Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, supra note 74, at 470 (citation omitted).
John Donohue has suggested that congnitive dissonance and use of the "availability"
heuristic may deter individuals from using seatbelts and other auto occupant safety devices. Donohue, Using Market Incentives to Promote Auto Occupant Safety, 7 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 449, 453-54 (1989).
106.

See supra text accompanying notes 74-79.

107. Leon Festinger is generally considered the father of dissonance theory by virtue
of his 1957 classic, L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). See also L.
FESTINGER CONFLICT, DECISION, AND DISSONANCE (1964).
108.

See supra notes 34 & 101.

109.

L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1-3 (1957).

110.

Id. at 3.

111.

Id. at 5-6.
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D.

Marriage Contract

An Initial Cost-Benefit Analysis of Aggressive
Promulgation

We have seen that when the Louisiana legislation was enacted,
the typical spouse-to-be was unlikely to have much knowledge of
the economic terms of the marriage contract and various erroneous beliefs might have deterred her from independently seeking
that information. Given the likelihood that some persons would
make certain life decisions differently if they had such information, there would appear to be clear benefits to the states'
promulgating the pertinent laws more aggressively than usual.
As a precondition of such Benthamite promulgation, we would
expect such benefits to exceed any costs.
An initial cost-benefit analysis suggests not only that this precondition had been met in the case of the Louisiana legislation,
but also that the most efficient time for any state to provide information about the economic terms of the marriage contract is
in fact when the Louisiana legislation required: at the time an
individual applies for a marriage license.
First, a very few individuals about to be married might, upon
receiving the information, find that the terms are not attractive
and decide not to marry after all. Were the information not provided until after the marriage license is issued, its potential effect on the actual decision to marry would obviously be reduced.112 Second, assuming that the information given spousesto-be included the fact that virtually all of the economic terms
of the marriage contract are merely "default" provisions, providing this information shortly prior to marriage would best enable
interested persons to contract around any of those provisions in
a timely manner. 11 3
Similarly, providing this information about the law immediately prior to marriage would enable spouses to make more informed life choices during marriage. Unfortunately, cognitive
dissonance is likely to make information about the laws governing marital dissolution least psychologically "accessible" to
the spouses at precisely this time. 4 In addition, normal
112. As the general population gains greater knowledge of this information, however,
it might affect persons' decisions to marry, even though the state never provided the
information to them personally.
113. Not all such contracting takes place prior to marriage. In some cases, the
spouses may not choose to contract about economic issues until they have been married
for some time. Such contracting is nonetheless "timely" if it occurs before divorce is
imminent.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 107-11.
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processes of information degradation may, over time, distort any
information given then or dilute its power to affect later life
choices. Providing information about the economic terms of the
marriage contract shortly prior to marriage, however, might at
least sensitize spouses-to-be to the fact that marriage is a legal
contract with a wide variety of economic terms and potential
consequences. Some persons might, therefore, be more likely to
seek out such information even years later when contemplating
decisions for which it might prove pertinent.
Obviously, this information would be likely to have its greatest impact if it were presented each time one confronted any of
the life choices to which it is potentially relevant, rather than at
the time one applies for a marriage license. Indeed, most legal
duties to disclose information require the disclosure to take
place shortly, if not immediately, prior to the time the pertinent
decision is made.115 But given the many personal decisions that
information about the economic terms of the marriage contract
might plausibly affect, and given the enormous variation in individuals' life choices and circumstances, it would scarcely be possible for a state to provide this information at those times.
In addition, because the marital relationship is an on-going
one subject to continual adjustment and negotiation, decisions
made in the context of that relationship may similarly evolve
over time. Thus, there may in fact not be any particular point in
time to which the above life choices may be specifically traceable. The most generally effective-as well as the most administratively feasible-point for disclosing information likely to be
pertinent to those choices may, therefore, be immediately prior
to marriage.
Shortly before marriage is certainly the time when it would be
least costly to provide information regarding the economic terms
of the marriage contract. The law has long required spouses-tobe to contact a municipal office to apply for a marriage license. 1 ' Thus, the relevant population already presents itself
through an existing mechanism to which the State could readily
and inexpensively add the distribution of printed legal information. Indeed, providing all marriage license applicants a statement in plain language of the laws governing the economic consequences of marriage would in many states require nothing
115.

See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 120-126.
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-201 (1985) (enacted 1947); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-14, 20-16, 20-20 (1983) (enacted 1919).

.116.
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more than adding another pamphlet to the information that is
already required by statute to be given them." 7
Thus, the only costs to any state of implementing such a program of systematic disclosure would appear to be the small ones
of writing, printing, and updating the materials to be distributed
to all marriage license applicants."18 Not only would those costs
likely be substantially outweighed by the expected benefits, but
we would expect the total cost to a state of providing such information to be a mere fraction of the total cost of all marriage
license applicants independently acquiring it.
E.

Historical "Ripeness"

Some time prior to 1975, all of the logically necessary conditions discussed above had been met in virtually all states regarding the economic terms of the marriage contract." 9 Why, then,
did no state take any action prior to 1975 to disclose those terms
through means other than the usual publication of statutes and
judicial decisions? The history of other legally mandated disclosure requirements may provide a partial answer.
Nearly all of the disclosure requirements that we now take for
granted arose only during the last 30 years. 20 Only since 1982
117. As of November 1, 1989, this information included birth control or family planning (seven states), GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-41 (1982) (enacted 1973); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 572-5 (Supp. 1988) (enacted 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.270 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (enacted 1972); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-405(h) (1984) (enacted 1957);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:28a (1983) (enacted 1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-240 (Law.
Co-op 1976) (enacted 1962); VA. CODE ANN. § 20.14.2 (Supp. 1989) (enacted 1972), genetic and pre-natal hazards (eight states), CAL. CIv. CODE § 4201.5 (West Supp. 1989)
(enacted 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-5 (Supp. 1988) (enacted 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 37:1-27 (West Supp. 1988) (enacted 1977); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 13-d (McKinney
1988) (enacted 1986); Of. REV. STAT. § 106.081 (1987) (enacted 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 15-2-3.1 (1988) (enacted 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 20.14.2 (Supp. 1989) (enacted 1972);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 765.12(1) (West Supp. 1989) (enacted 1985), and sexually transmitted
diseases including AIDS (six states), CAL. CIV. CODE § 4201.5 (West Supp. 1989) (enacted
1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-35.1 (Supp. 1989) (enacted 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-5
(Supp. 1988) (enacted 1987); IDAHO CODE § 32-412A (Supp. 1989) (enacted 1988); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-7-3-3.5 (Burns Supp. 1988) (enacted 1988); VA. CODE ANN. 20.14.2
(Supp. 1989) (enacted 1987).
118. The 1980 edition of the Louisiana pamphlet, for example, states that ten thousand copies were published at a total cost of $345.58. LOUISIANA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra
note 21. For a discussion of other, non-monetary costs of aggressive promulgation in this
context, see infra Part III.
119. Knowledge of the economic terms of the marriage contract would take on its
greatest importance when a state's no-fault divorce law went into effect.
120. The 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982 & Supp.
1988), provides the major exceptions. For example, since 1938, federal law has required
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have lending institutions been required to inform the borrower
of the total dollar amount of interest to be repaid; 121 not until
1976 were new cars required to bear a label stating their fuel
efficiency; 1 22 not until 1966 were the police legally obliged to tell
a person about to be arrested of her Constitutional rights to an
attorney and to remain silent;123 only since 1965 have cigarette
packs been required to bear a health warning; 12 not until 1957
were doctors required to provide patients pertinent medical information before accepting their consent to a particular
25
treatment.
In sum, it is only within the last few decades that the law has
come to require in various areas of everyday life that a person or
entity with presumptively superior information as to risks, contents, or consequences aggressively disclose that information
when the average individual is faced with a decision for which it
might prove pertinent. 2 Thus, the historical "ripening" within
American legal culture of mandatory disclosure of legal and nonlegal information emerges as a further necessary condition to be
met before Louisiana could enact its pathbreaking disclosure
legislation.
pharmaceutical companies to tell the consumer of potential adverse effects of using their
products, id. § 352, and has required processed foods to bear labels stating their contents, id. § 343(i).
For discussions of how and why the 1938 Act came into existence so early in this century, see, e.g., R. MERRILL & P. HUTT, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1980);
Cavers, The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its Substantive Provisions,6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2 (1939); Kleinfeld, Legislative History of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 1 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.Q. 532 (1946); Regier,
The Struggle for Federal Food and Drugs Legislation, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3
(1933).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
122. Id. § 2006.
123. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-91 (1966).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982 & Supp. 1988). Of course, some of the explanation for
the recent growth in health warning requirements is that the pertinent risks were only
recently scientifically established.
125. "The doctrine of informed consent surfaced, seemingly out of nowhere, in Salgo
v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees [317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1957)]." J. KATZ, supra note 54, at 60.
For a thorough discussion of the varieties of "informed consent" required by the laws
of different states, see Meisel & Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An
Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. PiTT. L. REV. 407 (1980). For a history of the rise
of-and subsequent partial retreat from-the legal doctrine of informed consent, see R.
FADEN, T. BEAUCHAMP & N. KING, supra note 54, at 114-50; J. KATZ, supra note 54, at 4884.
126. Why the "disclosure revolution" came when it did is a question worthy of investigation to which there may well be many answers.
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II.

Marriage Contract

FROM PUBLIC STATUS TOWARD PRIVATE CONTRACT

By 1975, all of the conditions logically necessary for aggressive
promulgation of the economic terms of the marriage contract
had been met in virtually all states.'27 Of those conditions, the
ex ante utility of knowledge of those terms reveals the most
about the law's conception of the marital relationship. In this
Part, I elaborate on the earlier discussion 2 ' and demonstrate
that the growth in the ex ante utility of that knowledge indicated a larger evolution from public status toward private contract in the law's conception of marriage. Thus, Louisiana's
Benthamite promulgation legislation can be understood as explicitly acknowledging-and mandating that marriage license
applicants be confronted with-the law's new conception of the
marital relationship.
A. The Traditional Conception of Marriage
In its 1888 opinion in Maynard v. Hill,'29 the Supreme Court
set out what it then considered to be the critical characteristics
of marriage: (1) Marriage is founded upon the agreement of the
parties;'30 (2) the terms of the marriage contract are determined
by law and cannot be modified or changed by the parties;' 3 ' and
(3) marriage is for life and the parties can neither agree nor contract to terminate it sooner.' 32 These attributes accurately captured the core of the law's conception of marriage from this
country's beginnings until the enactment of no-fault divorce
legislation.
Given these core characteristics, the marital relationship was
highly public. To marry was not formally to acknowledge the existence of a personal, and unique relationship, but rather was to
agree to live in a certain, State-specified way. Through prohibitions such as those against adultery and cruelty, which carried
127. The exceptions were the five states in which marital misconduct was still the
sole basis for divorce: Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota. See Freed, supra note 38, at 401. So long as a showing of "fault" was necessary to
obtain a divorce, many of the necessary preconditions for Benthamite promulgation of
the economic terms of the marriage contract were not met. See supra Part I.A.
128. See supra Part I.A.
129. 125 U.S. 190 (1888)
130. Id. at 210-11.
131. Id. at 211.
132. Id.
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substantial indirect economic sanctions, the law dictated central
aspects of the spouses' morality and interpersonal behavior.' 3 In
addition, the law mandated a gender-based economic relationship between the spouses: The husband was to support the wife
financially and she, in turn, was to provide him "household services."134 Once married, many of the spouses' larger decisions
about how to live were expropriated by the State. 135 These State
mandates, however, themselves embodied and were influenced
by existing norms of spousal behavior.
Because marriage was expected to be, and largely was, for
life, 13 divorce was not something for which one especially
needed to, or was encouraged to, plan. Consistent with both the
infrequency of marital dissolution and the constraints on
spousal economic behavior provided by the terms of the marriage contract, the law portrayed divorce as requiring unfortunate ex post "allocation decisions" rather than as necessitating
any ex ante economic contingency planning by the spouses.
The courts' treatment of the marriage contract in the context
of retroactive or other laws that might impair its existing obligations further underscored both the public and peculiarly ex post
aspects of the traditional marriage contract. Although the federal Constitution provides for the protection of citizens' contractual rights by prohibiting states from passing any "ex post facto
Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts,"' 7 the Supreme Court has long held that marital rights and obligations
are not contractual rights within the meaning of this provision. 3 s The perceived "specialness" of the marriage contract has
133. See, e.g., H. CLARK, JR., SECOND EDITION, supra note 26, at 496-510 and cases
cited therein. For an insightful and comprehensive discussion of the historical evolution
of moral thought and discourse in family law, see Schneider, Moral Discourse and the
Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985).
134. See, e.g., H. CLARK, SECOND EDITION, supra note 26, at 250-58, 265, 286-303;
Brown, The Duty of the Husband to Support the Wife, 18 VA. L. REV. 823 (1932); Crozier, Marital Support, 15 B.U.L. REV. 28 (1935); Paulsen, Support Rights and Duties
Between Husband and Wife, 9 VAND. L. REV. 709 (1956); Warren, Husband's Right to
Wife's Services, 38 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1925).
135. Social conditions, such as the few opportunities for women to work outside the
home, were reflected in the terms of the marriage contract and otherwise served to constrain the spouses' decisionmaking.
136. See supra notes 34 & 76.
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
138. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210 (1888); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 628-29 (1819). See also, e.g., In re Marriage of
Walton, 28 Cal. App. 3d 108, 112, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472, 475-76 (1972); In re Marriage of
Franks, 189 Colo. 499, 506, 542 P.2d 845, 850-51 (1975); Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480,
484-85 (1863); Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 271-73 5 N.E.2d 815, 816-17 (1936);
State v. Duket, 90 Wis. 272, 276-77 63 N.W. 82, 84-85 (1895).
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led courts to hold that state legislatures are free to alter the various laws that constitute the terms of the marriage contract and
to have those changes apply even to ongoing marriages. 39 The
courts have seemingly not been concerned that the parties to a
marriage contract might have relied on its original terms in deciding to enter into the agreement or in their subsequent
decisionmaking.
To justify these holdings, the courts have adverted first to the
"substantial public interest" with which the marital relation is
infused and which, they assert, mandates that it be subject to
plenary control by the state legislatures. 14 0 Thus, the courts have
determined that the marriage contract incorporates and contemplates not only the existing law, but also the reserve power of
the state to amend the law and enact additional laws "for the
public good."' 4 1
Second, the courts have focused on the allegedly "inchoate"
nature of the interests affected by changes in the laws that constitute the marriage contract. The courts have considered many
of the property and support rights growing out of the marriage
relation as not vesting until the legal dissolution of that relation. 142 Prior to vesting, they have considered such interests "expectancies," which therefore did not come within the protective
ambit of article I, section 10 of the Constitution. 43
The laws determining jurisdiction upon divorce, and therefore
also the state law to be applied, likewise underscored both the
public and the peculiarly ex post aspects of the traditional marriage contract. Jurisdiction merely to end the marital status
could be obtained in any state in which the plaintiff had been
domiciled for a period ranging from six weeks to three years
139. See cases cited supra note 138.
140. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. at 211, 213; In re Marriage of Walton, 28
Cal. App. 3d at 112, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 476; In re Marriage of Franks, 189 Colo.at 506, 542
P.2d at 850-51; Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. at 271-73, 5 N.E.2d at 816-17; State v.
Duket, 90 Wis. at 276-77, 63 N.W. at 84-85.
141. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Walton, 28 Cal. App. 3d at 112, 104 Cal. Rptr. at
476-77; In re Marriage of Franks, 189 Colo. at 506, 542 P.2d at 850-51; Fearon v.
Treanor, 272 N.Y. at 271-73, 5 N.E.2d at 816-17; State v. Duket, 90 Wis. at 276-77, 63
N.W. at 84-85.
142. See, e.g., Baker's Executors v. Kilgore, 145 U.S. 487, 489-91 (1891).
143. See, e.g., Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 402, 416 (1850) "The contracts designed to be protected by [Art. I, § 101 are contracts by which perfect rights,
certain definite, fixed private rights of property, are vested." (emphasis in original));
Baker's Executors v. Kilgore, 145 U.S. at 489-91; Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 628-29.
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before bringing the divorce action."' In order for a court to
award maintenance or to divide the property of the parties upon
divorce, however, personal jurisdiction over the defendant was
necessary.145 This could be obtained through "personal service in
the jurisdiction, by substituted service in accordance with local
rules if the defendant [was] a domiciliary, or as a result of the
defendant's personal appearance, if such appearance 4 subject[ed]
him to the court's power under the local practice."" 1
Thus, at the time of marriage, one could not know which
state's law would govern the economic issues should one later
divorce. Indeed, to the extent that the spousal support and
property provisions of the marriage contract varied across states,
reliable ex ante decision making by the spouses was nearly impossible because one could not know the substance of those provisions until jurisdiction had been established at the time of divorce. Insofar as the economic terms of the marriage contract
were in fact substantially uniform across states, the laws governing divorce jurisdiction still formally contributed to the law's
public and peculiarly ex post conception of the marriage contract prior to the enactment of no-fault legislation.
B.

Toward a Conception of Marriage as a Private Contract

By 1975, as we have seen, the laws governing several aspects
of marriage had evolved in a direction that substantially increased the ex ante utility of knowledge of the economic terms
of the marriage contract."17 At least four of those changes also
indicated a shift in the law's conception of marriage from that of
a public status, toward that of a private contract.
First, marriages were no longer presumed to be of life-long
permanence but had become essentially terminable at the will of
either spouse. 4 8 Second, "innocence" in the dissolution of the
marriage was no longer a necessary precondition for an award of
144. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-701 (1983) (six weeks); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-15
(1958 & Supp. 1969) (three years-has since been reduced to 12 months, see CONN.GEN.
STAT. § 46b-44 (1986)). See generally H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES, 285-86 (1968) [hereinafter H. CLARK, JR., FIRST EDITION]; H. CLARK,
JR., SECOND EDITION, supra note 26, at 413-14.
145. See H. CLARK, JR., FIRST EDITION, supra note 144, at 314 & nn.1-4; H. CLARK, JR.,
SECOND EDITION, supra note 26, at 443 & n.1.
146. H. CLARK, JR., FIRST EDITION, supra note 144, at 314 & nn.1-3; H. CLARK, JR.,
SECOND EDITION, supra note 26, at 443-44 & nn.1-5.
147. See supra Part I.A.
148. See supra notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text.
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post-divorce spousal support.1 4 Third, the law no longer assigned the spouses economic roles upon marriage,1 5 but instead
explicitly accommodated pluralism in the structure of household
economies: Two-career marriages as well as marriages in which
either spouse was the primary wage-earner had achieved comparable legal legitimacy and social acceptability.1 51 Fourth, consistent with this pluralism, it was increasingly acceptable and possible for one to formalize one's own variation on the economic
and other aspects of the marriage relationship through a written,
enforceable contract. 52 Through these four fundamental
changes, many more "moral" and economic aspects of the
spouses' lives became matters for their personal determination,
rather than being dictated by the State. Marriage thus became a
much less public and more private legal institution, able formally to accommodate broad variation in spousal behavior and
preferences.
Simultaneously, marriage became a less assuredly permanent
relationship and therefore more individualistic and less "communitarian" or "altruistic." The increased frequency of divorce
made it more likely that each spouse would consider that eventuality when deciding both how to structure the wage-earning
and homemaking components of the household economy and
whether formally to contract about the post-divorce allocation of
property and earnings. By taking the possibility of divorce into
account in their decisionmaking, the spouses would acknowledge
and reaffirm for themselves the fact that marriage is the uniting
of two individuals who could at nearly any time regain that earlier status.
C.

The Import of Louisiana's Promulgation Action

By requiring that all marriage license applicants receive information about the economic terms of the marriage contract, the
Louisiana legislature did not change any of those terms. Nor did
it in any way alter the conception of the marital relationship
those terms embodied. By mandating aggressive promulgation,
however, the legislature did, explicitly acknowledge-and confront potential spouses with-the law's new conception of mar149.
150.
151.
152.

See
See
See
See

supra note 39 and accompanying text.
supra note 134 and accompanying text.
supra note 45 and accompanying text.
supra notes 46 & 47 and accompanying text.
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riage: a contract with important economic consequences, whose
terms could be negotiated and formally altered by the spouses,
and that could be unilaterally terminated by either spouse at
virtually any time.
III.

THE PERSISTENT ACCEPTABILITY OF FORMAL NOTICE

Since the enactment of the Louisiana legislation in 1975, the
various conditions necessary for aggressive promulgation of the
economic terms of the marriage contract have existed in every
state. 5 3 No intervening changes in the pertinent substantive law
or American society have reduced either the utility of knowledge, or the risks attending ignorance, of those terms. To cite
just one example, the employment opportunities open to women
have grown during the past 14 years,1 54 increasing spouses' range
of choices in structuring the economics of their household and
simultaneously increasing the utility of knowledge of the economic terms of the marriage contract.
Nor is there reason to believe that the ordinary person is more
knowledgeable about the law than she was in 1975. The only
pertinent empirical study published since then, a 1984 survey of
422 California therapists, 55 found that virtually none (4%)
knew what California common law requires them to do when pa153. For persons domiciled in the five states that had not enacted no-fault divorce
laws as of 1975, knowledge of the economic terms of the marriage contract arguably had
less ex ante utility than for persons domiciled in other states. By 1985, however, even
Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota had passed some
form of no-fault law. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 401(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989)
(effective July 1, 1984); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 1A (1988) (effective Jan. 1, 1976); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (Supp. 1989) (effective July 1, 1978); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 201(c) (Purdon Supp. 1989) (effective July 2, 1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-2(7)
(Supp. 1989) (effective 1985).
154. Valid measures of employment "opportunities" are not easily obtained. Statistics, however, demonstrate women's greater participation in the workforce since 1975.
Women's share of total employment has increased every year since 1947 with the single
exception of 1953, when it declined a trivial two-tenths of a percentage point. From a
share of 28% in 1947, it increased to 32% in 1957, 36% in 1967, 41% in 1977, and 45%
in 1987. V. FUCHS, supra note 45, at 11-12.
Additionally, increasing numbers of women are employed in higher-level professional
and managerial occupations. In 1960, only 6% of new lawyers, physicians, and Ph.D.
recipients were women. By 1985, however, more than one-third of new entrants to those
high-level jobs were women. More than two-thirds of this gain occurred after 1975. Id. at
14.
155. Questionnaires were sent to 2,875 therapists in eight cities including San Francisco and Los Angeles; 1,722 (59.5 percent) responded, of whom 422 practiced in California. Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, supra note 56, at 455 n.49.
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tients utter threats against third parties during therapy. 5 ' Thus,
as recently as 1984, highly educated professionals were not particularly knowledgeable even about the law affecting their
specialties.
It further seems unlikely that any substantial number of persons has since 1975 begun seeking legal advice at the time of
first marriage. Consistent with the results of earlier studies," 7 a
1988 survey of 402 "New Yorkers" found that only 39% had
used a lawyer in the five years immediately preceding the study,
and only 27% had done so in connection with a personal matter.158 Nor is there reason to believe that the various psychological and cognitive deterrents to acquiring knowledge of the economic terms of the marriage contract 19 have in any way been
mitigated over the intervening 14 years.
Notwithstanding all of the above, no state has yet followed
Louisiana's lead and aggressively promulgated the economic
terms of the marriage contract. The unanimity of this failure is
especially surprising when one considers that the marital statutes of virtually every state have long embodied the concern
that individuals enter marriage intentionally and with an understanding of its seriousness and consequences. A marriage is usually considered legally voidable or void if either of the spouses at
1 under duthe time of marriage is below the "age of consent,"' 60
ress,''1 intoxicated or under the influence of drugs,

insane,'6 3

156. Id. at 465-68. Ninety-six percent of the California therapists surveyed had heard
of the Tarasoff decision, which contains the pertinent common law rule. Id. at 457-59.
Only 4% of those therapists, however, correctly understood the decision to require a
therapist to use "reasonable care" to protect those whose physical well-being is
threatened by a patient. Id. at 468. The remaining 96% of therapists familiar with the
case misunderstood its holding as follows: only requires warning the victim (64%); requires warning the victim and using reasonable care (28%); requires neither warning the
victim nor using reasonable care (4%). Id.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 62-69.
158. Kaplan, Lawyers Get No Respect, N.Y.L.J., May 23, 1988, at 1, col. 3, and at 4,
col. 3. The New York survey did not inquire into the nature of the matter for which the
attorney was consulted. Because the statistics for overall use of attorneys for a personal
matter were comparable to those of earlier studies, one might expect a hierarchy of uses
that is also comparable to those discussed supra text accompanying notes 62-69.
159. See supra Part I.C.
160. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.1, 20-48, 20-49 (1983 & Supp. 1989) (enacted
1919); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (1989) (enacted 1881).
161. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1506(a)(5) (1981) (enacted 1915); LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 93 (West Supp. 1989) (enacted 1870).
162. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.02 (West Supp. 1990) (enacted 1858); 48 PA.
CONS. STAT. tit. 48, § 1-5(g) (Purdon Supp. 1989) (enacted 1815).
163. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-7-3 (1972) (enacted 1942); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-2
(1986) (enacted 1849).
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an "imbecile" or "idiot,"'" 4 or otherwise mentally deficient.' 5 In
some states it is unlawful for the clerk even to issue a marriage
license if either of the parties appears at the time to be incapable of consenting. 6 6
The law, in sum, has long attempted to ensure that the parties
to the marriage contract have the capacity to understand the
terms of that agreement. Why, then, has no state but Louisiana
taken the logical next step and maximized the likelihood that
the parties also have a genuine opportunity to understand those
terms at the time of marriage. What does this unanimous failure
to provide marriage license applicants information about the economic terms of the marriage contract add to our understanding
of the law's current conception of the marital relationship?
What does that more complete conception add to our initial
analysis of the costs and benefits of aggressive promulgation of
the economic terms of the marriage contract?'
In this Part, I propose three plausible explanations for that
unanimous failure to act, each of which renders more complete
and complex our description of the law's current conception of
the marital relationship:168 a desire to perpetuate the romantic
ideal of marriage; a reluctance to acknowledge the increasing
"privatization" of marriage; and a persistent ambivalence toward divorce.
A.

The Romantic Ideal of Marriage

There is a great, if relatively modern, cultural tradition that
marriage is primarily, if not exclusively, about love."6 9 In two re164. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-5 (1988) (enacted 1896); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-2
(1986) (enacted 1849).
165. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.02 (West Supp. 1990) (enacted 1858); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-1-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (enacted 1902).
166. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5(F) (1972 & Supp. 1988) (enacted 1930); 48
PA. CONS. STAT. tit. 48, § 1-5(d) (Purdon Supp. 1989) (enacted 1815).
167. See supra Part I.D.
168. In an earlier piece, Baker, "I Think I Do": Another Perspective on Consent and
the Law, 16 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 256, 258-59 (Winter 1988), I propose another
jurisprudential explanation for the lack of Benthamite promulgation of the economic
terms of the marriage contract. That explanation, however, does not touch on the law's
conception of the marital relationship.
169. For historical discussion of the development of the romantic ideal in courtship
and marriage see, e.g., D. DE ROUGEMONT, LOVE IN THE WESTERN WORLD (1940); M. HUNT,
THE NATURAL HISTORY OF LOVE (1959); K. LYSTRA, SEARCHING THE HEART: WOMEN, MEN
AND ROMANTIC LOVE IN 19TH CENTURY AMERICA (1989). One of the earliest accounts of
romantic courtship is A. CAPELLANUS, THE ART OF COURTLY LOVE (J. Parry trans. 1941),
thought to have been written about 1180.
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spects this romantic ideal might partially explain the states' uniform failure agressively to promulgate the economic terms of the
marriage contract.
First, shortly prior to marriage the spouses likely feel unusually romantic and optimistic about their relationship. Were the
State to provide marriage license applicants information about
the economic terms of the marriage contract, it risks violating
the emotions of the moment. Instead, through its inaction, the
State helps perpetuate an image of marriage as a thoroughly romantic "uniting in love," without requiring the spouses to acknowledge that marriage is also an economic partnership, the
entering into of a contract with wide ranging economic consequences for the parties.
Second, the states' unanimous failure to provide spouses-to-be
information about the economic terms of the marriage contract
may represent a powerful underlying norm that such information should not play a role in certain life choices. We may not
want a woman's decision whether to be a full-time homemaker
and mother, for example, to be especially influenced by such
seemingly crass and contingent economic considerations as what
a maintenance award upon divorce is likely to be.17 0 Rather, we
may want her simply to do whatever her heart tells her, and
hope that, in the event of a divorce, she finds the maintenance
decision of the court acceptable.
Besides the perpetuation of a non-economic, romantic model
of the marital relationship, it is not clear what anyone-the
wife-to-be, her children, her spouse, society-gains from this
type of "blind" choice."' It seems implausible, for example, that
a woman would be a less "good" mother if she were informed of
the law and could, therefore, better evaluate in advance whether
becoming a full-time homemaker would provide her sufficient
long-term economic security in the event of divorce.

170. Other potentially affected decisions that we might also prefer be made without
particular attention to this information include who, whether, and when to marry; when
to have children and how many to have; and how long to stay out of the workplace after
the birth of a child.
171. In some cases, of course, the spouse may nonetheless know the pertinent law and
take it into account in his or her decisionmaking. As was shown above, however, see
supra Part I.C., a spouse is unlikely to have, or to seek, knowledge of the pertinent law
in the absence of state disclosure.
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Our Ambivalence Toward the "Privatizing"of Marriage

A reluctance to emphasize or even acknowledge the increasingly nonpublic nature of marriage is a second plausible explanation for the states' unanimous failure aggressively to promulgate the economic terms of the marriage contract. At the root of
this reluctance may be two more particular concerns.
First, were they to apprise spouses-to-be of the substance of
those economic terms, as well as the possibility of privately contracting around them, the states might be viewed as contributing
to, or even hastening, the extinction of the public institution of
marriage. As the opportunities for private ordering within marriage expand and become increasingly known, potential spouses
might increasingly see little reason to marry. If marriage no
longer embodies a (life-long) commitment to adopt the particular economic and moral lifestyle specified by the State, and if
commitment to the economic aspects of a couple's chosen lifestyle can be formalized through standard contracts, the public institution of marriage is reduced to a formalistic gesture.'7 2
Second, by informing the spouses of their option to contract
around the economic provisions of the marriage contract, the
states might be viewed as in fact encouraging such private ordering. One feared result of such "encouragement" might be a reduction in the perceived utility, and therefore also the frequency, of legal marriage. Further, because the uniformity of
lifestyle that marriage once represented might be thought to
have contributed to the stability of society as a whole, the
"privatization" of marriage could be viewed as an undesirable,
173
destabilizing force.
In sum, notwithstanding the increasing enforceability of
spouses' private contracts regarding the economic consequences
of divorce, 74 the states' failure to disclose to marriage license
172. Even as such, the legal institution of marriage is not without utility. At the very
least, the need to secure a formal divorce provides a barrier to exit that may increase the
duration, if not also the stability or happiness, of the spouses' relationship. In addition,
the formal institution of marriage serves a further, formalistic function with regard to
the "legitimacy" of the spouses' children.
173. See, e.g., M. GLENDON, supra note 20, at 104-11; Schneider, supra note 133. But
see, e.g., L. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT 227-54 (1981).
174. See supra note 46.
The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA), 9B U.L.A. 369 (1987), approved in
1983 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Bar Association, generally supports premarital contracts that address the
property division and spousal support that would result in the event of a divorce. As of
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applicants, and thereby to publicize, either the substance or the
"default" nature of the economic terms of the marriage contract
may indicate a deep ambivalence toward private ordering as an
increasingly acceptable substitute for the once purely public institution of marriage.
C.

Our Ambivalence Toward Divorce

A third plausible explanation for the states' unanimous failure
thus far to engage in more Benthamite promulgation of the economic terms of the marriage contract is our general ambivalence
toward divorce. The ease of obtaining a divorce, as well as the
frequency and acceptability of doing so, has increased over time.
We no longer attribute moral weakness or some personal failing
to a spouse whose marriage ends through divorce rather than
death. Indeed, it is virtually axiomatic that maximizing individual happiness was a major goal of no-fault divorce laws, which
made possible the unilateral dissolution of any marriage that
was no longer subjectively satisfying to either spouse. 75
In two respects, however, we may not yet be completely comfortable with these developments. First, they conflict sharply
with the optimism with which most marriages still begin, the belief that at least this time marriage means love without end, until death us do part. Providing marriage license applicants information about both the substance and the "default" nature of the
terms of the marriage contract concerning the economics of dissolution pointedly reminds them that the marriage upon which
they are about to embark may well not last a lifetime.
Second, the states may wish to draw a clear line between removing certain barriers to divorce and taking an action that
could be viewed as explicitly encouraging it. It was not so long
ago that the courts unanimously considered per se void as a vioFebruary 1989, it had been adopted by 13 states. 9B U.L.A. 13 (Supp. 1989).
The Uniform Marital Property Act (UMPA), 9A U.L.A. 97 (1987), also approved by
the National Conference and the ABA in 1983, is quite similar to the UPAA. As of February 1989, it had been adopted only by Wisconsin. Id.
See also, e.g., H. CLARK, JR., SECOND EDITION, supra note 26, at 1-20.
175. See, e.g., M. GLENDON, supra note 20, at 104-11; L. WEITZMAN, supra note 39, at
22-26, 37-41, 374-77; Schneider, supra note 133, at 1847-48, 1852-55;. But see, e.g., H.
JACOB, supra note 36, at 44-46.
Recently, Theordore Haas and Elizabeth Scott have argued that this goal may be more
problematic than originally thought, and have proposed various contractual restrictions
on divorce. Haas, The Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions on
Divorce, 66 N.C.L.REv. 879 (1988); Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and
Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9 (1990).
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lation of public policy antenuptial and other contracts between
the spouses made "in contemplation of divorce. 1 7 6 The reasoning provided then, but no longer considered persuasive,17 7 was
that a contract made "in contemplation of divorce" in fact facilitated, and therefore "encouraged," divorce, in violation of the
acknowledged State interest in the creation and perpetuation of
1 78
marriages.
By not providing marriage license applicants information
about either the laws governing the economics of marital dissolution or the possibility of privately contracting around those
laws, the states may be avoiding an action that could be interpreted as encouraging divorce. They might thereby also be
avoiding explicitly acknowledging, and possibly encouraging, the
more individualistic conception of marriage implied in ex ante
economic decision making by the spouses, including the decision
privately to contract about the economic. consequences of
divorce.
IV.

CONCLUSION

At least at present, no costless solution exists to the problem
of how best to promulgate the marriage contract. The issue,
rather, is which costs we prefer. Should the states continue to
provide only formal notice of the economic terms of the marriage contract, spouses as well as those contemplating marriage
will continue to make less informed decisions than they might
have otherwise have made. As a result, many of those individuals will, upon divorce, face a substantial and unexpected decline
in their economic condition, with its attendant "demoralization
179
costs.
176. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 29 Ariz. 538, 544-45, 243 P. 402, 404 (1926); In re
Gudenkauf, 204 N.W.2d 586, 587 (Iowa 1973); Fincham v. Fincham, 160 Kan. 683, 688,
165 P.2d 209, 213 (1946); Matthews v. Matthews, 2 N.C. App. 143, 147, 162 S.E.2d 697,
699 (1968); Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 604, 385 S.W.2d 288, 293 (1964); Fricke
v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 129, 42 N.W.2d 500, 502 (1950); see also, e.g., L. WEITZMAN,
supra note 167, at 338-44.
177. See supra note 46.
178. See supra note 170.
179. As used in legal scholarship, the term "demoralization costs" appears to have
been coined by Professor Frank I. Michelman in his classic piece, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967). Following Michelman, I use it here to mean both "(1)
the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities which accrue to [litigants] and their sympathizers specifically from the realization" that the law as applied to their cases will not
have the result that they expected; and "(2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost
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Should the states choose finally to follow Louisiana's lead and
engage in more Benthamite promulgation of the economic terms
of the marriage contract, they will incur different costs. In addition to the greater expense of providing actual notice of such

laws, citizens of those states will face the various direct and indirect "de-romanticization" costs attending such disclosure.
Given this formulation of the promulgation problem, it seems
especially curious and noteworthy that nowhere in Bentham's

extensive and engaging discussion18 ° does he mention the costs
of implementing any of his frequently elaborate promulgation
proposals. Nor does he ever attempt to persuade the reader that
the benefits of a particular proposal would exceed its costs.
There is, in sum, little evidence of the utilitarian that we find
elsewhere in Bentham's writings, 181 and that he is (rightfully)
considered. 182
For Bentham, a balancing of costs and benefits in the promulgation context was simply unnecessary because he believed the
State had a straightforward, unmitigatable duty to provide its
citizens actual, rather than merely formal, notice of the laws."8 3
For us, however, the promulgation problem is more complicated.
For we would weigh the costs to the State, as well as the resultfuture production (reflecting either impaired incentives or social unrest) caused by demoralization by uncompensated [litigants], their sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by the thought that they themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on
some other occasion." Id.
180. See citations to essays by Bentham supra notes 2 & 3.
181. The most notable of these is likely Chapter 1 of An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, entitled "Of the Principle of Utility." 1 J. BENTHAM,
supra note 2, at 1.
182. The General Preface to the Bowring edition of Bentham's collected works, for
example, states:
[Bentham] met with Hume's Essays, and found in them what he sought-an
unassailable central principle, from which he might sally on his quests after
truth, and to which he might retire to recruit his powers by repose whenever he
was baffled. This was the principle of utility, or, as he subsequently expressed it
with more precision, the doctrine that the only test of the goodness of moral
precepts or legislative enactments, is their tendency to promote the greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible number. Armed with this discovery, he
applied it on all occasions, thereby at once directing himself to the truth, and
establishing, by a multiplicity of experiments, the trustworthiness of his test.
General Preface, in 1 J. BENTHAM, supra note 2, at viii (emphasis added).
183.
To lodge and fix in each man's mind, that portion of the matter of law on which
his fate is thus dependent-exists there that State, in which this operation is not
among the most important duties of the government? Yet, where is the state, by
the government of which any attention whatsoever appears to have been paid to
it?
4 J. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 481 (emphasis in original; footnote deleted); see also 1 J.
BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 155-163.
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ing social benefits, of providing actual notice of a law. And we,
unlike Bentham, seem to believe that knowledge of the law, even
taken alone, is not always and unambiguously better than ignorance. For sometimes that knowledge comes at the cost of dimming, if not entirely dispelling, our most precious ideals and
cherished hopes. And that price is one we cannot always afford
to pay.

